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Abstract 
The aim of the thesis is to analyse the non-bank regulatory framework with particular 
attention devoted to hedge funds and private equity funds. The thesis describes functioning 
of the funds, discusses their performance during the global financial crisis of 2007-present 
and, predominantly, describes and analyses the EU and U.S. regulatory reforms with 
respect to these institutions which have arisen as a response to the crisis. Based on the 
analysis of the measures incorporated in these reforms, the thesis outlines its own proposal 
of an alternative investment fund regulatory framework which, if applied, would lead to a 
more efficient functioning of the alternative investment industry than what is likely to be 
the outcome of the already adopted reforms. 
The nature of the thesis is institutional; its methodology is characterized by a broad 
literature survey. Hedge funds and private equity funds are considered both in pre-crisis 
context as well as in circumstances that have been brought about by the crisis. Several 
hypotheses concerning systemic risk and the approach of the regulatory reforms to it are 
assessed. Mostly qualitative analysis is employed to evaluate the hypotheses. 
Key words: AIFM Directive, alternative investment fund, Dodd-Frank Act, hedge fund, 
non-bank institution, private equity, regulation 
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Abstrakt 
Cieľom tejto práce je analýza regulačného rámca nebankových inštitúcií so zvláštnou 
pozornosťou venovanou hedge fondom a private equity fondom. Práca popisuje činnosť 
fondov, rozoberá ich výkonnosť počas globálnej finančnej krízy, trvajúcej od roku 2007 až 
dodnes, a najmä popisuje a analyzuje reformy finančnej regulácie v EÚ i v USA týkajúce 
sa týchto inštitúcii, ktoré sa objavili ako odpoveď na ekonomickú krízu. Na základe 
analýzy opatrení, ktoré sú súčasťou prijatých reforiem, je v práci načrtnutý vlastný návrh 
podoby regulačného rámca pre alternatívne investičné fondy, ktorý by v prípade prijatia 
viedol k efektívnejšej činnosti sektoru alternatívnych investičných fondov, než aká 
pravdepodobne bude výsledkom prijatých reforiem. 
Povaha práce je inštitucionálna, pre jej metodológiu je preto typický rozsiahly 
prieskum literatúry. Hedge fondy i private equity fondy sú skúmané v predkrízovom 
kontexte ako i v podmienkach, ktoré priniesla kríza. Práca posudzuje niekoľko hypotéz 
týkajúcich sa systémového rizika a prístupu novoprijatých reforiem k nemu. Hypotézy sú 
skúmané najmä pomocou kvalitatívnej analýzy.  
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1. Introduction 
The 2006 burst of the U.S. housing bubble, which resulted in a steep decline of real 
estate prices, an increase of mortgage rates and a subsequent rise of defaults on subprime 
mortgages, gave rise to what is known as a subprime mortgage crisis. Mortgage-backed 
securities widely held by financial institutions lost a lot of their value. The resulting 
collapse of large players in the financial market then changed the subprime mortgage crisis 
into a global financial crisis, believed by many to be the most severe one after the Great 
Depression of the 1930’s. 
Not only banking products and credit derivatives, but also instruments such as hedge 
funds or private equity funds are often believed to have played a significant role during this 
global financial turmoil. Allegedly, they have done it in a sense that they contributed to the 
extent of the crisis and increased the pace of its spread over the world. Subsequently, in the 
light of serious economic problems, questions arose whether regulations of these 
instruments were sufficient or whether the effects of the global crisis could have been 
smoothed, if regulation and supervision had been stricter. 
Thus, as the crisis developed, many ideas of reforming the regulatory framework of 
the overall financial system have arisen. Among them, there have been debates over the 
necessity of strengthening the regulation of the non-bank sector as well. The outcomes of 
these debates have mostly materialized in two legal provisions – the Dodd-Frank Act in the 
U.S. and the AIFM Directive in the EU.   
The aim of this thesis is to describe the non-bank regulatory framework in both the 
EU and the U.S. and to assess the aforementioned new provisions dealing with non-bank 
financial regulation. Further, an efficient and appropriate regulatory framework for 
alternative investment funds (AIFs) as a subgroup of non-bank financial institutions will be 
outlined. Indeed, the focus will be placed on AIFs – hedge funds and private equity funds – 
throughout the thesis. In addition, we will analyze the following hypotheses: (1) non-bank 
financial sector carries a considerable portion of systemic risk, (2) AIFM Directive will 
bring more costs than benefits to the system, and (3) rates of return of various hedge fund 
strategies are strongly correlated. 
We will mostly use a qualitative analysis method to discuss the hypotheses which 
will be largely based on a broad survey, analysis and comparison of the available literature 
on the financial system regulation. The third hypothesis will be assessed using data 
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published by the Hedge Fund Research, Inc. and computing correlations of the rate of 
return indices of various hedge fund strategies. 
The structure of the thesis looks as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the (non-bank) 
financial regulation generally, and then focuses separately on the recently updated 
frameworks of the EU and the U.S. followed by their comparison. Chapter 3 aims at hedge 
funds and private equity funds, their basic features, regulation and the recent financial 
crisis performance. Chapter 4 outlines a hypothetical regulatory framework for alternative 
investment vehicles that we consider to be the most appropriate. Finally, Chapter 5 
concludes the thesis. 
Besides the properly cited references, several parts of the following text also use 
ideas that were already contained in Šinka (2010) without citing them explicitly 
.  
  
2. Regulation and Supervision of the Non
First of all, we would like to outline the way of thinking that features this thesis
devotes special attention to two types of non
funds and private equity funds. 
it is useful to think about how much money these institutions 
illustrates what amounts of money we bear in mind when we deal 
investment vehicles and compares them to the amount of assets of 1,000 largest banks 
worldwide. 
Figure 1: Assets of Global Private Equity Market, Global Hedge Funds and 1,000 Largest Banks as of 2009
Source: TheCityUK – IFSL estimates
The disproportion is striking. Total assets of global hedge funds and global private 
equity market only account for 1.76% and 2.67% of total assets of 1,000 largest banks, 
respectively.  
Further, let us compare hedge funds and private equity funds to 
some other non-conventional investment vehicles
Figure 2 which depicts the global fund management industry
of the particular institutions of the industry.
-
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We observe another huge disproportion between hedge funds and private equity 
funds and institutions such as pension funds
to TheCityUK (2010a), the global fund management industry administers approx. 
$105 trillion. Out of it, conventional investment vehicles 
Similarly to banking institutions, they are subject to regulation. On the contrary, private 
equity funds manage less than one
insurance funds (the smallest sector of the depicted conventional investment vehicles), 
while hedge funds administer one
Hence there is an important question to think about stemming from the 
mentioned facts – does it actually make sense to regulate additional few trillions USD 
when we already regulate tens of trillions USD
precisely as we have seen during recent years?
the regulation of hedge funds and private equity funds that we consider appropriate.
Yet, before we start to deal with non
subchapter we will briefly discuss the general characteristics of financial regulation, its 
economic sense but also costs it may bring to the society.
1.0
0
Private wealth*
ETFs
Hedge funds
Private equity
SWFs
Insurance funds
Mutual funds
Pension funds
* around one-third of private wealth is incorporated in conventional investment management
4 
– assets under management 
, mutual funds or insurance funds
manage by far the largest part.
-eighth of the amount of assets under management of 
-twelfth of the insurance funds’ assets.
, and still the system might collapse 
 In this thesis we will provide our views on 
-bank institutions intensively, in the following 
 
1.7
2.5
3.8
20.4
22.9
28.0
5 10 15 20 25 30
$ trillion
non-conventional  
(alternative) investment 
management assets
 
. According 
 
 
above 
 
39.0
35 40
conventional 
investment 
management 
assets
5 
 
2.1. Financial Regulation Basics 
Financial markets have always been very sophisticated. But still, they have always 
been very vulnerable to many kinds of internal as well as external shocks. Markets as such 
are imperfect and market failures might represent a considerable source of costs to be 
imposed on the market agents that cannot be adequately reflected in the price mechanism. 
Externalities and asymmetric information are the main examples of such market failures 
which produce sub-optimal results and reduce consumer welfare. These negative impacts 
can be local, regional or nationwide, i.e. of a systemic character (Mejstřík, Pečená & 
Teplý, 2008). Hence a regulatory framework has been established to prevent, or at least 
smooth, the negative impacts threatening the financial markets. 
However, before we start to talk about regulation, it will be useful to mention the 
division of “goods” traded by the financial sector.1 Basically, the “goods” traded by 
financial institutions are certain promises – the institutions “promise to deliver specified 
payments at specified times, under specified circumstances”.2 These promises can be 
divided into three categories: 
• debt promises – promises to pay fixed cash at fixed time in the future 
(deposits, bonds, treasury bills, mortgages), 
• equity promises – claims over residual earnings of a business, with no 
guarantee of the size or timing of the payments, usually with voting rights 
(shares), 
• contingent promises – promises to pay certain payments under specific 
circumstances (insurance, guarantees). 
Further, bearing in mind the three categories of promises mentioned above, we can 
also divide financial institutions into several categories, according to the nature of their 
activity and, where it is possible to distinguish, to the type of promise their activity bears. 
Deposit-taking institutions, such as banks, accept deposits and provide loans and 
provide for payment and liquidity services. Usually, their services do not exceed the range 
of debt-type promises. 
Risk-pooling institutions, such as insurance companies, are specialized in selling 
contingent promises, usually divided into life and non-life insurance. 
                                                           
1
 The division and description of both promises and institutions is based on Carmichael & Pomerleano 
(2002). 
2
 Carmichael & Pomerleano (2002), pp. 2 
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Contractual savings institutions, such as mutual funds and their variations, provide 
equity promises in a way that they transform individuals’ investments into various debt, 
equity and derivative (i.e. mixed type of promise, e.g. option) promises, from which they 
generate profit which is then used to meet equity promises towards their clients. 
Specialized sectoral financiers are financial institutions providing debt or equity-type 
promises to specific group of clients, taking advantage of better knowledge of the 
particular sector than general financial institutions. 
Market makers, such as securities dealers, work as specific devices which ensure the 
functioning of securities markets. They make primary and secondary markets in securities, 
hence provide liquidity (by making markets they turn illiquid assets into liquid ones) and 
informational services. 
Financial service providers form the remaining group of financial institutions 
encompassing all kinds of advisors, consultants and brokers. 
The list mentioned above was originally provided by Carmichael and Pomerleano 
(2002) and it encompasses all usual types of institutions that appear in financial markets. 
However, there are also other institutions that interfere significantly in financial markets 
that are not treated as financial institutions in usual sense. They are the Ministries of 
Finance, regulatory agencies, rating agencies, etc. In other words, they are the institutions 
that provide rules and information on the proper and legal conduct of financial business. 
According to Llewellyn (1999), there are three objectives that regulation of financial 
markets follows: (1) maintaining systemic stability, (2) maintaining safety and soundness 
of financial institutions, and (3) protecting the consumers. Regulatory authorities do so by 
altering the behaviour of regulated institutions either by issuing rules that must be 
followed, or by creating incentives, so that the desired behaviour of a particular institution 
is in the institution’s own interest. 
Persaud et at. (2009) formulate the basic purposes of regulation similarly but still a 
little bit differently, as they apply the reasons for regulation stated by the “traditional 
economic theory”. So in their view, regulation serves (1) to constrain the use of monopoly 
power, to avoid serious distortions to competition and to maintain market integrity, (2) to 
protect the essential needs of ordinary people in cases where information is hard or costly 
to obtain and mistakes could devastate welfare, and (3) to prevent such market failures 
which cause social and overall costs higher than a total of private costs of the failure and 
the costs imposed by regulatory measures designed to prevent the failure. Persaud et al. 
also provide a closer explanation of the application of the above mentioned three points on 
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the financial market. (1) has mostly been the issue in other economic sectors and has been 
applied in financial markets only for a few times.3 (2) has led to the institution of a deposit 
insurance, mostly up to 100%. Full deposit insurance, however, has accentuated another 
market failure – moral hazard. When there is a guarantee both for financial institutions as 
well as for their customers that in case of troubles someone else will pay for the mistakes, 
incentives for higher risk-taking of financial institutions are increased, as well as are 
increased the incentives for depositors to seek institutions offering higher return, i.e. the 
high-risk ones. See inter alia Llewellyn (1999) or Persaud et al. (2009) for more 
information. (3) appears to be the most important reason of why financial regulation exists 
at all. The systemic externalities exist because of the strong inter-connectedness of the 
financial system.4 Failure of one big bank weakens other financial institutions as well as 
financial markets involved with the bankrupt bank, unlike other sectors of the economy, 
e.g. car producers, where other producers are stronger rather than weaker after one of their 
competitors has gone bankrupt. 
Llewellyn (1999) points out an important fact about regulation, namely that neither 
regulatory nor supervisory services are supplied through a market process. In this way 
valuable information on the type and extent of regulation that consumers demand is lost. 
Neither we know how much the consumers, who are moreover not homogeneous, are 
willing to pay for regulation. Further, Llewellyn continues that by not going through the 
market process regulatory services might appear to be costless and, combined with risk-
averse regulators, there is a danger of regulatory over-demand by consumers and over-
supply by regulatory authorities. Since regulation imposes non-negligible costs upon 
society, there is a danger that excessive or inappropriate regulation will result in greater 
social costs than are the economic costs originally designed to be overcome by regulation. 
Hence it is crucially important to analyse carefully every additional regulatory measure 
that is planned to be imposed, so that an increase of social costs instead of a desirable 
decrease does not take place. 
Taken from the other side, insufficient regulation is likely to increase social costs, 
too. Undoubtedly, financial regulation has its important place in the system. The economic 
                                                           
3
 This point might however gain in importance in the near future, as one of the effects of the latest crisis 
has been a reduction in competition among banks. Mostly in the U.S. but also in Japan weaker banks have 
been taken over by large banking institutions, leaving the market with a relatively small number of large 
players in the banking industry (Persaud et al., 2009). 
4
 For discussion of the sources of systemic externalities see Persaud et al. (2009). 
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rationale for financial regulation could be summarized into seven components.5 Firstly, it 
is the problem of externalities of a systemic nature. The economy stands and falls on the 
financial institutions, especially banks, which are subject to runs. But what is important, 
not only badly-performing banks are run on; the negative externality of a bank run is 
spread all over the system and adversely affects also solvent institutions. The effect of 
contagion can then cause solvent banks to become insolvent. Hence certain amount of 
regulation is appropriate in such situations where social costs of failure exceed private 
costs and where these potential social costs are not incorporated in the institution’s 
decision making. Secondly, the existence of market failures and imperfections, such as 
asymmetric information, agency problems or conflicts of interests, justifies the regulatory 
costs. If there were no market imperfections, no regulation would be necessary. In the real 
world, however, the rationale for regulation is to correct for market failures or 
imperfections, so that the outcome of the market is not suboptimal as it would be if there 
were no regulation on imperfect markets. Thirdly, consumers need to monitor financial 
institutions which they deal with. It is much more efficient if they delegate monitoring to a 
regulatory agency, since duplication of the same monitoring activities by all consumers 
incurring excessive social costs is thus avoided and economies of scale derived via a 
specialist regulatory authority with the necessary expertise and efficiency. Fourthly, the 
concept of “market for lemons” applies. In a situation when consumers know there are 
good and bad firms but only can judge their quality after a contract has been agreed upon, 
the demand for firms’ product may decline, since consumers are reluctant about buying it, 
as they are not willing to take the risk of choosing a bad firm. Further, good firms may 
suffer from a poor reputation of the industry caused by bad firms. The role of regulation is 
therefore to set minimum standards of quality and in this way to relieve the market of 
“lemons”. This is closely related to the fifth component, the so-called grid lock problem, 
which arises when firms know how they should behave but choose hazardous strategies 
anyway, since these will bring them higher short-term profit and can be detected only after 
some time. Good firms are thus likely to be driven out of business by the bad ones or they 
are induced to take up hazardous strategies of the bad firms, too. As a solution, regulation 
can break the grid lock by imposing standards within which all firms will behave. Sixthly, 
moral hazard for both consumers and financial firms stemming from the safety net 
arrangements for financial institutions is a challenge for regulation, which is supposed to 
                                                           
5
 Following the economic rationale for financial regulation provided by Llewellyn (1999) 
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be set up in a way to decrease the probability that the moral hazard will be exploited. 
Finally, the seventh component of the economic rationale for financial regulation is the 
consumer demand for regulation. Consumers may demand regulation for any of the 
reasons mentioned above and it is rational for the suppliers – regulatory authorities – to 
satisfy this demand, since it means a gain in welfare. Hence “the costs of regulation are 
not dead-weight costs”.6 
An obvious fact is that regulation does impose costs on market participants. Another 
obvious fact is, however, that costs levied upon market participants would in many cases 
be much higher absent regulation. Thus, “the art of regulation” lies in the ability to find the 
optimal solution, i.e. to determine what issue needs a regulatory measure and, on the other 
hand, what is already an excessive regulation that uselessly increases social costs. In this 
thesis, we will analyse non-bank institutions, particularly hedge funds and private equity 
funds, from this very perspective. 
2.2. Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
To start with non-bank institutions, let us discuss what they actually are and what 
their importance for the financial market is. Basically, a non-bank financial institution is an 
institution in the financial market that does not possess a full banking licence, usually is 
subject to less strict, if any, regulation and supervision of a regulatory authority, and 
provides bank-type services. 
So what can we imagine under the notion of a non-bank financial institution? The 
term is relatively broad but for the purposes of this thesis it refers mostly to the risk 
pooling and contractual savings institutions described earlier in this chapter, or more 
broadly to the global fund management industry. Generally, the global fund management 
industry can be divided into three groups7: (1) conventional funds, which include mutual 
funds, pension funds and insurance companies, (2) non-conventional (alternative) funds, 
including hedge funds, private equity funds, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and exchange 
traded funds (ETFs), and (3) private wealth funds, which are funds managed on behalf of 
the high net worth individuals (TheCityUK, 2010a). However, we will focus our attention 
almost entirely on the second category institutions, namely hedge funds and private equity 
funds. 
                                                           
6
 Llewellyn (1999), pp. 32 
7
 See also Figure 2 
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According to Carmichael and Pomerleano (2002), there is strong evidence 
suggesting that financial development as well as financial depth and diversity add to 
economic growth and development. In considering whether the non-bank institutions are 
also necessary for this growth and development or not, the authors provide the following 
reasoning. 
As has been already mentioned, there are three types of promises traded by several 
types of financial institutions. Technically, all these promises could well be traded by a 
single financial institution. In other words, a bank could well provide all types of financial 
products. However, the problem is that this would be extremely inefficient. A bank 
provides certain services that are core with respect to the nature of the institution, such as 
provision of payment and liquidity services. Since these services must be low-risk, the 
bank is limited in what type and amount of assets it can include in its balance sheet. Hence 
a constraint is imposed on what additional services to its core ones the bank can provide so 
that their performance remains efficient (Carmichael & Pomerleano, 2002). For this 
reason, banks usually provide only certain types of services, leaving the remaining ones for 
other financial institutions. This is the area where non-bank institutions gain their 
importance. Insurance companies, contractual savers, securities dealers, and many others, 
specialize in services that banks do not provide or provide only to a minor extent. 
Non-bank institutions are nowadays often referred to as the shadow banking system 
(Krugman, 2008). This is because they perform activities that are bank-like without being a 
bank formally, hence escaping the regulatory net imposed on the banking sector. The name 
comes from the fact that while conventional banks which take deposits “operate more or 
less in the sunlight, with open books and regulators looking over their shoulders”8, non-
bank institutions – non-depository institutions yet “banks” in the nature of the services they 
provide – stay somehow in the shadow from the lights of regulatory authorities. 
Traditionally, the focus of the financial market regulation and supervision has been 
mainly on the banking sector, as it has been believed to carry the largest portion of 
systemic risk. It is of no wonder, since, as Tucker (2010) notes, banks are the very centre 
of the monetary and payment system, as well as of the credit system. Due to their nature, 
they are very fragile, and their fragility and linkages to other parts of the financial system 
threaten the economy as a whole. Hence a “social contract with the authorities”9 has been 
developed over time to protect the society from shocks it might suffer due to the financial 
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system fragility. The “social contract” involves issues such as deposit insurance, prudential 
regulation and supervision and liquidity insurance from central banks. Such a regulatory 
policy within a banking sector is necessary, since the motivation for market participants 
including banks is “to protect themselves but not the system as a whole… No firm … has 
an incentive to limit its risk-taking in order to reduce the danger of contagion for other 
firms.”10 Hence, without regulation, externalities imposed by the systemic risk of the 
banking sector would not be internalized (Schwarcz, 2008). But what about the non-bank 
sector? Is it necessary to regulate it, too? If so, to what extent? 
The answer to these questions is not straightforward. On one hand, the contractual 
savings sector, a part of the non-bank sector on which we will focus the most, depends 
fundamentally on the level of trust. Investors need to believe that their investments are safe 
and that there is a potential to earn profit on the investments, rather than a risk of losing of 
their money, so that they are willing to give up their resources for a long period of time, 
since the funds are usually locked in the institution for certain time periods. Such a market 
confidence is usually encouraged strongly by different regulatory measures. On the other 
hand, repressive regulation can impede the growth and the development of contractual 
savings institutions, hence of the whole financial sector in consequence (Carmichael and 
Pomerleano, 2002). There are arguments against regulation specifically concerning 
sophisticated financial institutions that pursue innovations thanks to the fact that they are 
not excessively regulated, such as hedge funds. 
We have already mentioned why non-bank institutions exist at all. Let us review that 
it is a matter of specialization. Some non-bank institutions perform activities that banks 
usually do not do or do not do in a large scale (e.g. insurance companies) for reasons that 
were mentioned above. Yet, there is another reason for the existence of non-banks besides 
the specialization issue. It stems from the above mentioned fact about the lack of 
incentives to protect the system as a whole. As Tucker (2010) points out, the banking 
regulatory framework pursues health and safety of the banking system; however, it pursues 
them more than banks and their shareholders would themselves. These are worse off than 
they would be absent regulation, since many of the strategies they would like to employ in 
order to increase their profits are simply prohibited by the authorities. In this way, 
incentives arise to place some business activities of banks outside the banking system and 
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thus escape the coverage of the “social contract” – regulation by the financial authorities. 
At this point, the non-bank financial intermediation originates. 
Non-bank institutions founded on the grounds of the second reason are of particular 
interest of this thesis. It is because of the fact that they de facto perform banking activities 
without being regulated nor supervised in a way the banks are, or being regulated much 
lighter. They are therefore free to employ strategies according to their will, regarding only 
the risk they might impose on the particular institution itself, however caring less about the 
risk their activities might represent for the financial system in general. Moreover, many 
non-banks often compete with banks themselves. It is not rare that banks invest in non-
banks. Because of these interlinks non-bank institutions are often alleged to be a source of 
systemic risk, too. 
To illustrate the danger of unregulated non-bank financial institutions (which are, 
however, far from being as sophisticated institutions as hedge funds or private equity 
funds), we will depict the situation in Slovakia at the end of 1990’s and at the beginning of 
the 21st century in Box 1. The failed Slovak non-bank institutions were not of a systemic 
importance. However, because they focused on retail clients, many investors lost their 
investments due to the lack of regulation after the institutions had gone bankrupt. 
Box 1: Frauds and failures of non-bank financial institutions in Slovakia 
 
 
  
Frauds and Failures of Non-Bank Financial Institutions in Slovakia 
During the 1990’s, there was a boom of setting up businesses in non-bank subjects in 
Slovakia. More than 60 such deposit institutions were created. Out of these, only 13 are 
still active nowadays, 22 went bankrupt and the rest is investigated by the police. It is 
because fraud was the most common way of operating non-banks during the period. 
Though not possessing a banking license, the institutions collected huge amounts of money 
in deposits from small investors – ordinary people – while promising them very high rates 
of return. Those managers, whose intentions were not clear, used the Ponzi scheme 
(pyramidal game) and actually did pay returns to the investors for some time. However, 
this could only work until the institutions accepted more money in deposits than they had 
to pay out. Once the situation reversed, both managers and money usually fled abroad. 
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2.2.1. Systemic Risk in the Shadows 
It is obvious that systemic risk will be a crucial notion in our further discussion; 
hence it is important to define it properly at this moment. In doing so, we will make use of 
the analysis of systemic risk by Schwarcz (2008). He distinguishes the institutional 
systemic risk (failure of many institutions, bank or non-bank, which deprives society of 
capital and increases its costs, e.g. bank run) and the market systemic risk (risk affecting 
the market as a whole that cannot be cancelled out by portfolio diversification). One of 
these aspects or both of them jointly might then cause a chain of negative economic events 
occurring in a domino effect and affecting substantial part of the society. Schwarcz 
therefore defines the systemic risk as “the risk that an economic shock such as market or 
institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either the failure of a chain of 
markets or institutions, or a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, resulting in 
The most publicly discussed case of such fraudulent practices was the case of 
Horizont Slovakia and its affiliated company BMG Invest, which jointly collected almost 
63 billion SKK during the period of 1997-2002. After they went bankrupt in 2002, just 53 
billion were paid to the investors. Although the authorities had constantly alerted the public 
that these institutions were not subject to bank regulation nor were they secured by the 
Deposit Protection Fund and that investing in them was very risky, 170,000 people were 
hurt by the failure, not having been paid back their deposits. 
Ever since the fall of the companies, there have been discussions whether the 
investors hurt by the failures do have a title to be compensated by the government for their 
lost investments or not. Some say investors invested in the non-bank companies on their 
own behalf, knowing that they were exempt from banking regulation and supervision and 
despite the fact that it had been obvious that promised returns were very unrealistic and 
highly suspicious. Still, others claim that the state supervisory authorities failed their duty 
to ensure safety of investments within the financial sector and thus the government has to 
compensate the hurt investors. This issue has even become a part of election programmes 
of several political parties which promise to compensate those who lost in non-banks. No 
compensation, however, has taken place yet. 
Source of data and information: 
http://hnonline.sk/slovensko/c1-21270710-chronologia-pripadu-bmg-invest-a-horizont-slovakia 
http://openiazoch.zoznam.sk/produkty/ni/ukladani.asp 
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increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by 
substantial financial-market price volatility”.11 
In his analysis, Schwarcz further notes that, regarding systemic risk, the nature of 
business of a given institution is much less important than whether it is a critical player in 
the market or not. If it were critical one, its failure (or subsequent chain of failures of other 
institutions) would significantly affect the cost and availability of capital, while if it were 
not, it could only have similar consequences if the player in troubles were large enough to 
affect the capital markets viability. To illustrate Schwarcz’s concern, let us consider a 
failure of an institution that is not crucial for funding of the companies (e.g. hedge fund). 
Whether this failure will have extensive consequences affecting large parts of markets does 
not depend on the fact that the institution is a hedge fund (or a bank, insurance company, 
etc.) and that such a type of institutions features such and such risks, but on the likelihood 
that failure of this particular institution will negatively affect viability of capital markets.  
Therefore, when analyzing the potential of any institution for being a source of 
systemic risk, one must consider whether the particular institution is significant enough 
and interconnected enough with other important market players in such a way, that the run 
of investors to close-out their position due to its failure would also affect other market 
participants, hence leading to heavily increased market uncertainty about future price 
moves. If this is the case, many credit and interest rate markets would have to compensate 
for the high uncertainty by means of raising their risk premiums. Finally, this would result 
in an increased cost of capital and its decreased availability which is the most important 
direct consequence of systemic risk (McDonough, 1998).12 
So, is there any systemic risk stemming from the shadow banking system? We will 
employ a qualitative analysis to consider the hypothesis. 
• Hypothesis 1: Non-bank sector of financial markets carries a considerable 
portion of systemic risk. 
Krugman (2008) notes that “until the crisis hit, few people seem to have appreciated 
just how important the shadow banking system had become”.13 He argues that risks taken 
(and implicitly also imposed) by institutions that had never been regulated were the core of 
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what caused the latest crisis. Since unregulated shadow banking institutions had been 
expanding heavily to even overtake the conventional banking sector in importance, a 
situation very similar to the pre-Great Depression times was gradually created, when 
financial system became extremely vulnerable to any kind of misconduct or undesirable 
market development. Krugman refers to the failure of extending the regulatory net over 
shadow banking institutions as the “malign neglect” and adds a rule according to which 
“anything that does what a bank does, anything that has to be rescued in crises the way 
banks are, should be regulated like a bank”.14 
However, Krugman’s view does not reflect reality accurately. The nature of the latest 
crisis was bank-like more than anything else. The role of non-bank institutions, out of 
which hedge funds are most often blamed for being in the very centre of the crisis, was 
limited to increasing the price volatility in capital markets due to their need to 
deleverage.15 Although there were many hedge fund closures after the crisis broke out, 
there was no major failure that would have imposed any substantial threat on the system. 
Many closures were voluntary and did not cause any losses to the investors (Król, 2010). 
As Petajisto (2010) says, the latest crisis accounted for a period of real-life “stress testing” 
which should have exposed all the fragilities of the system but still hedge funds did 
relatively well. To prevent the adverse effects of runs, many funds suspended redemptions 
after the crisis began. Moreover, levels of leverage were much lower than they were in 
times of the LTCM. 
Another argument against major systemic importance of AIFs has already been 
mentioned in the beginning of the thesis – the size of assets under management of 
particular institutions. In Figure 1 we have seen that global hedge funds only account for 
approx. $1.7 trillion of assets. Such a low number, compared to the amount of assets of 
banks, can hardly be systemically relevant, even if we take the counterparty risk into 
account.  
All in all, hedge funds seem to have taken their lessons from the events of the past. 
To blame them for being reliable for the crisis is thus not wise. However, not to be 
misunderstood, we do not claim there is absolutely no systemic risk stemming from the 
non-bank sector. The risk of a failure is always present and it depends on circumstances 
what its potential consequences might be. This is especially true for conventional 
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investment funds which cumulatively account for approx. $71 trillion of assets (Figure 2). 
They are, however, subject to regulation. The issue of AIFs is thus of higher interest. 
As we will see in Chapter 3.1.3.3, there is some correlation between rates of return of 
various hedge fund strategies. Hence returns of different strategies react jointly to some 
extent to the development in the market. Therefore, in case of a significant market drop 
many hedge funds might find themselves in a loss or even fall. This has actually been the 
reality during the latest crisis. In theory, such an adverse development in the hedge fund 
sector could expose its major institutional investors to danger of losing amounts of money 
so large that they could end up in failure themselves, which could set up a chain of failures 
endangering the system as a whole. In reality, however, we have seen no such systemic 
chain of failures due to a failure of a non-bank institution during the latest crisis. One of 
the reasons is definitely the aforementioned small size of the AIF sector. Hence, we 
believe it is not necessary to impose additional strict regulation on it. 
To conclude, there is some (theoretical) systemic risk stemming from the non-bank 
sector, however it is minor and it has not been the cause of the latest financial crisis. 
• Hypothesis 1: Non-bank sector of financial markets carries a considerable 
portion of systemic risk. 
Based on the discussion above we reject the hypothesis. Systemic risk present 
in the non-bank sector is only minor. 
2.3. Credit Rating Agencies 
Another important issue with respect to both bank and non-bank sector is the role of 
credit rating agencies (CRAs). In today’s globalised financial markets, their ratings are 
crucial for further conduct of a particular institution being rated as well as they are 
important for many other market players, mainly the institution’s creditors. Indeed, by 
providing information on the rated security credit ratings reduce information asymmetries, 
and thus reduce investors’ costs to research the creditworthiness of the rated asset. Hence, 
ratings of Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s or Fitch, but also of other rating agencies, have 
evolved into an essential part of day-to-day conduct in financial markets. 
More importantly, however, credit ratings have evolved into a regulatory instrument, 
since many regulators have incorporated them into their regulatory requirements. 
According to Katz, Salinas & Stephanou (2009), by making credit ratings a cornerstone of 
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regulations the regulators have effectively outsourced many regulatory functions to CRAs 
which thus play a critical role of “capital market gatekeepers”. The authors are certainly 
correct to consider the situation paradoxical, since although regulation is heavily based on 
credit ratings, the CRAs has been subject to only a limited oversight which has resulted in 
a critical lack of liability. 
 After the global crisis broke out in 2007, the CRAs have come under strong 
criticism. They have been believed by many to have underestimated the credit default risk 
of instruments collateralised by subprime mortgages. Further, they decreased the credit risk 
perception by assigning AAA ratings to structured financial products that did not deserve 
such a level of rating which is usually given to standard government and corporate bonds, 
since they contained elements with much worse rating. Due to regulation rules that require 
specific investors to only invest in products with AAA rating, demand for these structured 
assets increased (De Larosière, 2009). 
Another source of criticism of the CRAs has long been the fact that they do not 
downgrade the ratings promptly enough. Katz, Salinas & Stephanou (2009) provide the 
Latin American debt crises and the 2001 collapse of Argentina or the cases of Enron, 
Worldcom or Lehman Brothers as examples of such slow reactions.16 Hence investors, 
among which non-bank institutions such as hedge funds are not unusual, invest into 
products that are riskier than they seem to be at the time of purchase. Credit risk of the 
investors’ portfolio is thus increased. In response, systemic risk potential increases, too. 
The core of the problem seems to lie within the fact that under the current credit 
rating framework the CRAs are entirely financed by the issuers of securities that are rated. 
It is argued by many that in this way a conflict of interests arises (see e.g. 
Andrlíková (2010) or De Larosière (2009)). Instead, De Larosière suggests the European 
Union switch from the “issuer pays” to an “investor pays” model of CRAs. 
The problem is obvious. When selling new securities, the issuer wants to sell them at 
as good a price as possible. Naturally, assets with higher rating are traded at higher prices. 
Hence, at the time the rating for particular asset is to be determined, there is a strong 
incentive for the issuer to “negotiate” a more desirable outcome of the rating decision 
process. Certainly, he is in a position to do so, since it is him who pays for the rating 
agency services. Transparency of ratings is thereby rather distorted. Further, a CRA has an 
incentive to determine higher ratings for certain class of issuers to attract more businesses 
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in this class (Andrlíková, 2010). Low transparency of ratings is adversely affected also by 
not providing sufficient information by CRAs on their methodologies and assumptions. 
According to Andrlíková (2010), low transparency together with high complexity of 
structured financial products being rated could have led to “rating shopping”, i.e. a 
situation when the issuer pays several CRAs to determine the future rating of his issue and 
chooses the one that offers the most favourable rating. 
Moreover, the credit rating industry is to a large extent an oligopolistic market 
structure.17 Three major CRAs – Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch – cover more than 
97% of the market share (see Table 1). High concentration of the credit rating market is 
a result of high barriers to entry stemming from reputational capital as well as from the 
wide coverage that has been built by major rating agencies over time. The major CRAs 
were in consensus about the evolution of the subprime market and “and did not anticipate 
in their ratings the scale of the deterioration that ultimately transpired and led to the crisis 
of confidence in their ratings”.18 Incentives for a conservative approach were reduced by 
the fact that cutting the ratings down would have decrease the inflow of new structural 
finance ratings and associated revenues. The lack of competition could have therefore 
negatively affected the development of the subprime crisis in a way that higher 
competition among CRAs would have been likely to identify the near crisis sooner, more 
coherently and with a better communication of the information to the market 
(ESME, 2008). 
Hence some correction of the credit rating framework seems to be necessary. 
De Larosière’s suggestion of implementing the “investor pays” model appears to be a 
reasonable idea. No more would the issuer have the power to influence the performance of 
the rating agency under such a framework, since this would be paid for by the buyer of the 
asset. It is the buyer who is the end-user of the information contained in the rating; hence 
there is an economic sense to charge him for the access to the information. But it is 
necessary to admit that the “investor pays” model is very likely to increase administrative 
and transaction costs of trading. The cost of rating would have to take form of a 
subscription fee payable with the intermediary such as stock exchange, broker, etc. An 
investor will probably not be willing to pay a fee to learn the rating in order to generate 
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comparable revenue on the investment. Hence, much fewer issues will be assigned ratings 
as a result and information asymmetries will rise. 
Alternatively, Katz, Salinas & Stephanou (2009) propose a hybrid solution in a form 
of a rating determined by an existing rating agency and paid for by the issuer who will, 
however, be required to seek also a second rating from a “subscriber fee” rating agency. 
Table 1: Number of credit ratings and market shares of CRAs in the U.S. in 2008 
 
Source: Andrlíková (2010) 
In the U.S., the July 2010 adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act changes rules of the game 
for CRAs.19 Since CRAs have been recognized by the U.S. government as systemically 
important and their “inaccurate” ratings have been alleged to contribute to the risk 
mismanagement of large financial institutions and investors (Dechert, 2010), the agencies 
will be regulated more strictly. They will be subject to more intensive internal controls and 
stronger transparency requirements. See Dechert (2010) for a broader discussion of the 
influence of the Act on CRAs. 
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Financial 
Institutions
Insurance 
Companies 
Corporate 
Issuers
Asset-Backed 
Securities
Government, 
Municipal & 
Sovereign
Total Ratings Market Share
A.M. Best 3 6,009 2,710 54 0 8,776 0.28%
DBRS 18,040 110 7,080 7,470 10,560 43,260 1.38%
EJR 62 46 803 14 9 934 0.03%
Fitch 83,649 4,797 14,757 77,480 491,264 671,947 21.51%
JCR 155 31 544 71 71 872 0.03%
LACE 18,000 100 2,000 0 300 20,400 0.65%
Moody’s 84,773 6,277 31,126 109,261 880,880 1,112,317 35.61%
R&I 100 32 600 210 100 1,042 0.03%
Realpoint 0 0 0 9,200 0 9,200 0.29%
S&P 47,300 6,600 26,900 198,200 976,000 1,255,000 40.18%
Total 252,082 24,002 86,520 401,960 2,359,184 3,123,748 100.00%
HHI 2,686 2,467 2,636 3,550 3,539 3,347    
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2.4. European Union vs. United States 
2.4.1. The G-20 Agenda 
After the latest crisis struck financial markets, debates have arisen whether 
regulatory frameworks are appropriate and sufficient and whether they might have carried 
some part of guilt on the global turmoil. Namely, regulatory and supervisory frameworks 
of the European Union and of the United States seem to be of the highest concern. 
The debates resulted in actions on both sides of the Atlantic. However, the actions 
have not been negotiated in isolation. Instead, the G-20 promoted an international 
coordination of the regulatory responses to the crisis.20 The G-20 agenda aims at 
improving macroeconomic cooperation and strengthening of international financial 
institutions, and concentrates on finding coordinated regulatory solutions on the following 
key issues: 
• Macro-prudential supervision – to establish framework to deal with macro-
prudential risks and develop tools 
• Complex financial institutions – to improve oversight framework 
• Systemic risks – international guidelines for definition of systemic 
importance, and avoidance of regulatory arbitrage 
• Prudential regulation – to strengthen prudential regulatory standards, 
improve quantity and quality of bank capital, discourage excessive leverage, 
strengthened liquidity requirements, adopt Basel capital framework 
• Bank resolution – to address cross-border resolution 
• Comprehensive data – to ensure gathering relevant information and 
international consistency 
• Hedge funds – registration and conduct-of-business requirements 
• Derivatives – to improve OTC derivative markets, promote standardisation 
and resilience of credit derivative markets, and establish central clearing 
counterparties 
• Credit rating agencies – registration and oversight rules21 
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In the following two subchapters, regulatory frameworks of the EU and the U.S. with 
focus on non-bank institutions as well as the regulatory responses to the crisis will be 
described. Then, a subchapter comparing the EU with the U.S. approach in light of the G-
20 agenda will follow. 
2.4.2. European Union 
The pre-crisis process of the development of a financial regulation legislature within 
the EU was called the Lamfalussy Process and it encompassed four levels, each focusing 
on a specific stage of the legislative implementation. Level 1 embraced creation of 
legislature to be incorporated in the framework (Council of the European Union, European 
Parliament, and European Commission). Level 2 comprised special committees of national 
ministries of finance which worked out details of the legislature. Level 3 consisted of the 
supervisory institutions, promoting the cooperation among national supervisory authorities. 
They were the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR), and Committee of European Insurance and 
Occupational Pension Supervisors (CEIOPS). However, their decisions were not legally 
binding. Finally, Level 4 embodied the enforcement of the regulatory legislature which 
was the responsibility of the European Commission.22 Obviously, the Lamfalussy structure 
was rather complicated. No wonder that CNB (2009) considered it to be one of the 
fundamental problems of the European integrated market, alongside with the fragmentation 
of the European supervisory authorities. 
As a response to the crisis, a special group chaired by Jacques de Larosière was 
formed by the European Commission in October 2008 to work out plans for restructuring 
the European financial regulatory and supervisory framework. Results of the work of the 
De Larosière Group were published in a report in February 2009. Few months later, in 
April 2009, draft proposal of a new directive on improvement of the regulatory and 
supervisory framework of alternative investment vehicles was issued by the European 
institutions. Both documents provide variety of suggestions on improvements of the 
framework in order to prevent excess volatility and turmoil in the markets. Meanwhile, the 
third important document dealing with the post-crisis regulatory system adjustment 
referred to as the Turner Review was published by the FSA in March 2009. We devote the 
next three subchapters to a brief description of these documents. 
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2.4.2.1. De Larosière Report 
In their report delivered in February 2009, members of the De Larosière 
Group (2009)23 deal with the characteristics of the pre-crisis regulatory and supervisory 
framework. In light of the global crisis, they list numerous recommendations on how the 
European regulatory and supervisory framework should be improved in order to prevent 
the crisis to repeat. Among other issues concerning banking sector, they also express their 
view of the role and future regulation and supervision of the “parallel banking system” 
(non-bank financial institutions) and institutions such as CRAs. 
According to the Group, the primary cause of the recent crisis was the excess 
liquidity and low interest rates. They also note that the consequences of these two factors 
were amplified and accelerated by financial innovation in the markets. What can we 
imagine under the notion of financial innovation? Basically, it is the variety of loan 
instruments that were used extensively by many financial institutions, such as 
securitization of loans by means of mortgage or asset backed securities that were traded 
globally, expanding the leverage within the financial system. In addition, non-bank 
institutions are also involved in the Group’s notion of financial innovation. 
According to Trpčevski (2010), the De Larosière Report has become a basis for the 
European Commission’s plans of restructuring the EU regulatory and supervisory system. 
The Group’s recommendations were transformed into proposals of establishing new 
institutions such as the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), and transformation of the 
Level 3 Committees (CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR) into the European Banking Authority 
(EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).24 This will be discussed later on. 
Of course, the report of the De Larosière Group has not raised only positive reactions 
but also much critique. One of the most comprehensive pieces of critique has been the 
report of the Czech National Bank (CNB, 2009). CNB criticises the De Larosière Report 
for not taking into consideration the necessity of creating a broad supervision across all 
sectors of the financial market and for burdening the supervisory structure with excessive 
number of national supervisory authorities instead. The CNB report contains opinions on 
all of the thirty-one recommendations of the Group. While CNB accepts many of the 
Group’s findings, it also strongly opposes those issues where its sovereignty would be 
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weakened (Trpčevski, 2010) or where persisting fragmentation of the supervisory structure 
would even be intensified. 
2.4.2.2. AIFM Directive 
At the end of April 2009, the European Commission published a draft of the 
Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers25 (the “AIFM Directive”) in a 
response to the demand for improved regulation and supervision that had been raised on 
the G-20 summit few weeks earlier.26 In November 2010, it passed the European 
Parliament and came into force in early 2011. The Directive seeks to provide a framework 
for all AIFs other than those regulated by the UCITS Directive.27 It deals extensively with 
hedge funds, as well as with other types of funds, such as private equity funds, sovereign 
wealth funds, etc., and their managers. Each manager running a fund within the EU has to 
be authorized by the national regulatory authority of the country where he is established. 
Once such an authorization has been granted, he can operate throughout the whole EU, a 
principle similar to UCITS funds.28 The “EU passport” will be granted also to third-
country fund managers under the condition that the third country’s legal system is in line 
with the Directive.  
The AIFM Directive sets rules for authorisation, ongoing operation and transparency 
of managers. Every EU-domiciled manager managing more than €100 million of assets in 
an AIF will be subject to authorization requirement. In order to obtain authorization, the 
Directive requires managers to provide detailed information on their business activities, 
characteristics of the alternative funds they manage and their governance systems. Further, 
it defines exemptions from its force for managers who manage unleveraged funds and 
provide their investors for redemption rights no more often than once in five years. In such 
a case, a threshold of €500 million applies (Ossendorf & Jekl, 2010). Other measures 
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contained in the AIFM Directive include regulation of short-selling, obligations to appoint 
an independent valuator and a depositary, limits on use of leverage, etc. 
• Hypothesis 2: The AIFM Directive will bring more costs than benefits. 
Immediately after the draft Directive was published, it raised intensive reactions of 
both positive and negative nature. For example, Persson of the OpenEurope (2009) sees the 
benefits of the Directive in increasing the transparency and disclosure of the investments 
and in potential enhancement of the Single Market by the possibility of the manager to 
market his fund throughout the whole EU once he has been authorised. On the other hand, 
Persson also expects additional costs to the industry, investors and economy as a whole to 
offset the benefits of the Directive. He notes that the managers might stop entirely 
marketing their funds in the EU due to many restrictions and prohibitive costs imposed by 
the Directive. This would lead to decreased investments in Europe, thus leaving the whole 
EU less competitive. The opponents of the Directive further raise complaints about its 
protectionist nature which might cause similar counter-measures in the non-EU countries. 
Non-EU funds or EU funds managed by non-EU managers will need to satisfy various far-
from-easy conditions in order to be authorized by the EU authorities and to be granted the 
“EU passport”. In this area, powers of ESMA will be substantially increased by the 
Directive, empowering it, given certain conditions are satisfied, to intervene in the 
marketing of EU funds managed by non-EU managers if it assumes there is a meaningful 
concentration of market risk or counterparty risk to a systemically important institution 
stemming from the fund’s activities (Ashurst, 2010). Similarly, ESMA may impose limits 
on a fund’s leverage if it concludes that the current level of leverage imposes a substantial 
risk on the health and stability of the financial system. Another source of concerns of the 
critics of the Directive stems from its “one-size-fits-all” approach not distinguishing 
between systemically important and “other” funds. 
However, there are also keen supporters of the AIFM Directive. One of the most 
well-known is the Party of European Socialists. Its president Poul Nyrup Rasmussen 
suggests even stricter rules to be implemented into the Directive, such as regulation to be 
imposed not only on managers but on funds themselves as well, non-EU funds to be 
covered by the European regulation, strict limits to be imposed on the level of leverage and 
penalties to be outlined for improper conduct (Rasmussen, 2010). In his view, hedge 
funds’ activities were one of the major causes of the latest financial crisis through “their 
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extensive use of risky, so-called ‘innovative’ products, their level of leverage, their pro-
cyclical conduct and, generally speaking, their role as part of the ‘shadow banking 
system’ ”.29 
There is a nice assessment of the AIFM Directive in the AIMA position paper 
(AIMA, 2009).30 It summarizes all the profound changes that the Directive brings to the 
regulatory framework and divides them into aspects that are welcomed and aspects that 
raise AIMA’s concern.31 The welcomed aspects or aspects welcomed with reservations are 
the following: (1) registration of hedge fund managers following the UK model, (2) 
disclosure of systemically relevant data to regulators, (3) enhanced transparency by 
improved provision of information to counterparties and investors, (4) “EU passport”, and 
(5) attempts at the development of global harmonised short selling regime. On the other 
hand, there are important issues in the Directive that AIMA disagrees with: (1) the 
protectionist nature of the Directive decreasing the attractiveness of Europe among 
investors, (2) reduction in investor choice due to provisions on the third country marketing 
that are likely to make many non-EU funds unavailable to EU investors, (3) third country 
marketing conditions making non-EU fund managers highly unlikely to be able to comply, 
(4) provisions regarding the delegation of certain functions of an alternative investment 
fund manager (AIFM) to third parties which require such a third party also be authorised 
by the regulatory authority and which are likely to prevent investors from the expertise of 
non-EU experts, (5) restrictions on leverage, and (6) the requirement that the hedge fund 
depositaries be an EU credit institution strictly liable for its own failures, which would 
substantially increase fees that would be subsequently passed to end investors. Further, 
other general concerns about the AIFM Directive are that in many cases it provides for a 
higher level of protection for professional investors than for retail investors (set by the 
UCITS framework) and, similarly to the FSA, the “one-size-fits-all” approach applied on 
AIFs by the Directive. 
According to Ossendorf & Jekl (2010), the AIFM Directive took over a wide range 
of measures from the UCITS Directive, such as the extensive information obligations 
towards supervisory authorities as well as towards investors. However, the UCITS 
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Directive applies to investment funds that are offered to the public while AIFs are mostly 
directed at qualified investors. Hence, copying of provisions from the UCITS Directive is 
not a step in the right direction. This is the meeting point of virtually all critics of the 
AIFM Directive. Moreover, the Ossendorf & Jekl criticise the fact that regulation only 
applies to AIFs and not to other investment banking institutions such as banks or 
investment firms. 
In Table 2 we provide a comparison of the opinions of the CNB represented by 
Ossendorf & Jekl (2010) and the AIMA (2009) over the AIFM Directive with additional 
comments where necessary. The CNB assessment represents the point of view of the EU 
member state national regulatory and supervisory authority, while the AIMA assessment 
stands for the opinion of a representative of the global hedge fund industry. In the 
rightmost column, the author of this thesis expresses his own opinion on the main AIFM 
Directive provisions which appear to be a compromise of the CNB and AIMA positions. 
It took more than a year and a half from the release of the first draft to the final 
adoption of the AIFM Directive by the European Parliament. Nevertheless, many of its 
provisions seem not to have been thought over thoroughly and they are likely to do more 
harm than benefit. On one hand, the European Single Market might well be improved by 
the introduction of the “EU passport” and regulators might better oversee EU financial 
markets due to improved provision of systemically important information. But on the other 
hand, some of the AIFM Directive provisions will have significant adverse effects, such as 
its protectionist nature and the related decrease of investment options for investors which 
might result in a decline of competitiveness of the EU, and in similar counter-measures 
being adopted by non-EU countries. We believe that it would be more efficient to focus on 
regulation of institutional investors with systemic potential engaging in investments in 
AIFs rather than on imposing regulatory rules on the alternative funds themselves. 
• Hypothesis 2: The AIFM Directive will bring more costs than benefits. 
Based on the qualitative analysis above the hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
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Table 2: Comparison of the CNB, AIMA and author’s opinions on selected aspects of the AIFM Directive 
AIFM Directive 
Regulatory 
Provision 
CNB AIMA Author 
“EU Passport” for 
AIF managers + + + 
Leverage limits 
- - - 
Disclosure of 
information to the 
supervisory 
authority 
- 
According to the CNB, 
the set of information 
demanded by the 
Directive is much larger 
than the one currently 
demanded by the Czech 
law. The use of 
information for the 
purposes of prudential 
regulation is debatable, 
since AIFs are focused 
mostly on sophisticated 
investors. Moreover, the 
Directive should not 
attempt at limiting risks 
at all, since higher risks 
are the way of obtaining 
higher returns. 
+ 
AIMA supports the 
provision of data to 
supervisors but only 
those of systemic 
importance and only in 
reasonable volumes in 
order not to overwhelm 
supervisors with huge 
volumes of worthless 
data from small AIFs 
which cannot be 
considered systemically 
relevant. 
+ 
Disclosure of 
systemically important 
data to regulators is 
important but the 
threshold should be set at 
a relatively high level in 
order to prevent 
regulators from being 
overloaded by data from 
smaller funds. AIMA’s 
suggestion of a threshold 
of €1 billion seems 
reasonable. 
Disclosure of 
information to 
investors in order to 
improve 
transparency 
- 
The CNB considers the 
information obligation 
towards investors 
surprising, since the 
AIFs are intended 
primarily for 
professional investors. 
+ 
AIMA supports the 
enhanced information 
provision for 
counterparties and 
investors even though the 
AIF investor base 
consists primarily of 
sophisticated investors. 
Nevertheless, they 
suggest the information 
rules to be set at 
reasonable levels. 
- 
Sophisticated investors 
investing in AIFs 
perform their own risk 
assessment and are likely 
to be influential enough 
to obtain all the 
information they need. 
Hence the increased 
compliance costs due to 
this AIFM Directive 
provision will be higher 
than its value added. 
2.4.2.3. Turner Review 
Naturally, neither the FSA remained reluctant to the development in the financial 
sector after 2007. In March 2009, it published the Turner Review (FSA, 2009), named 
after its chairman Lord Turner, a document dealing with the question of the financial crisis 
response in the UK as well as elsewhere in the world and with suggestions of the post-
crisis financial system improvements that would ensure higher stability of the system and 
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prevent similar economic breakdowns from happening as the world has witnessed since 
2007. 
Before giving recommendations, the Turner Review analyzes causes of the crisis, i.e. 
explains factors that led to the significant downturn in recent years. Five key features are 
identified: 
(i) The growth of the financial sector 
(ii) Increasing leverage 
(iii) Changing forms of maturity transformation 
(iv) A misplaced reliance on sophisticated maths 
(v) Hard-wired pro-cyclicality 
To explain each of them briefly, (i) refers to the remarkable growth of the financial 
sector over the last twenty years which has featured the development of the securitised 
credit model, which “increased the potential impact of financial system instability on the 
real economy”.32 This is documented in Figure 3 on the case of the UK via the evolution 
of debt as a percentage of GDP by borrower type. (ii) reflects the increasing leverage 
accompanying the rise of the financial sector supported by a rise of highly leveraged off-
balance sheet items (such as Structured Investment Vehicles) and by a creation of products 
“which had very high and imperfectly understood embedded leverage”.33 Thus obtained 
overall leverage helped to create vulnerabilities that have subsequently deepened the crisis. 
(iii) refers to the rise of the shadow banking sector and the growing proportion of maturity 
transformation function performed by institutions within this sector based on the belief that 
long-term assets financed by short-term liabilities may be sold quickly in liquid markets if 
needed. This belief turned out to be invalid after the crisis broke out. For illustration, the 
rise of the shadow banking is documented on the case of the U.S. in Figure 4. (iv) follows 
the evolution of sophisticated mathematical techniques for risk measurement that was 
believed to match the increasing complexity of the securitised credit market, especially the 
concept of Value-at-Risk34(VaR), which had become a standard within the industry as well 
as among regulators. But the use of this risk measurement has been questioned and accused 
of pro-cyclicality when based on short-term historical data. This relates to (v), namely to 
the factors that helped to built the pro-cyclicality in the system. Among them, there were 
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especially credit ratings and other arrangements that related credit ratings and VaR 
outcomes to various forms of triggers, margins or haircuts that behaved rather pro-
cyclically from the systemic point of view. 
Figure 3: UK debt as a % GDP by borrower type (1987-2007), Debt Liabilities on B/S 
 
Source: FSA (2009) 
Figure 4: Growth of Non-Bank Financial Institutions in the United States (in $ trillions) 
 
Source: IMF (2010) 
Note: Shadow banking liabilities include commercial paper, medium-term notes, asset-backed commercial 
paper, asset-backed securities, repurchase agreements, total return swaps, hybrid and repo/TRS conduits, 
ABS CDOs, ABS CDO-squareds, bonds, capital notes, and 1$ NAV shares (shadow bank “deposits”). 
Turner Review lists 28 recommendations on the system improvement in total. The 
variety of their objectives is very wide and they are divided in the following categories:35 
• capital adequacy, accounting and liquidity (inter alia a call for a significant 
increase of the minimum regulatory capital requirements above existing Basel 
rules) 
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• institutional and geographic coverage of regulation (inter alia a call for the 
authorities to be empowered to gather information on all significant unregulated 
financial institutions to allow assessment of system-wide risks) 
• deposit insurance 
• UK bank resolution  
• credit rating agencies (inter alia a call for registration and supervision of CRAs) 
• remuneration (a call for policies to be designed to avoid excessive risk taking) 
• CDS market infrastructure  
• macro-prudential analysis 
• FSA supervisory approach 
• firm risk management and governance 
• utility banking versus investment banking (a call for capital and liquidity 
requirements to be designed to limit the role of commercial banks in proprietary 
trading activities) 
• global cross-border banks 
• European cross-border banks (inter alia a call for a new independent European 
regulatory authority that would replace the Lamfalussy committees) 
2.4.2.4. The Resulting EU Regulatory Response to the Crisis 
Although the initial intentions of the EU authorities were to deal with the supervisory 
problems via the existing framework, new approach gradually emerged. It is mainly the 
credit of the De Larosière Report and recommendations it brought. In May 2009, the 
European Commission announced that the recommendations would be widely accepted 
(Trpčevski, 2010), which led to the legislative proposals on the creation of the ESRB and 
on the creation of EBA, EIOPA and ESMA in September 2009. In 2010, the proposals 
were adopted. 
The ESRB was established in January 2011. It is responsible for the macro-
prudential oversight of the EU financial system that is about to actively monitor sources of 
risks to financial stability of the EU (Constâncio, 2010). The EBA, EIOPA and ESMA 
replaced the Level 3 Committees and started their operation in January 2011, too. These 
bodies are empowered to intervene in the affairs of individual countries if the EU members 
conclude that the domestic regulatory authorities fail to exercise their duties properly. 
Thus, the EU supervisory authorities “complement the existing oversight system in the 
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member states by specifically addressing cross-border and system issues as well as 
inconsistencies in regulation and supervision among the member states”.36 There had been 
significant opposition against the proposals before their adoption from the side of national 
supervisors of member states who saw a loss of sovereignty in them (see the already 
discussed CNB (2009)), however, as Trpčevski (2010) states, by the opposition national 
regulators only agreed to cosmetic changes which were important but still not sufficient. 
As for the alternative investment vehicles regulatory framework, it will be largely 
reformed by the AIFM Directive. The Directive covers registration, disclosure and 
transparency requirements, conduct-of-business rules, rules for marketing of third country 
funds and other provisions for all AIFs about a critical size (Deutsche Bank 
Research, 2010). However, as has already been mentioned, it is questionable whether all 
these measures are necessary in such an extent. Similar recommendations were included 
also in the De Larosière Report but were wisely opposed by CNB (2009). 
We have depicted only few features of the new EU regulatory framework which we 
consider the most important from our point of view. The EU regulatory response to the 
crisis follows the objectives of the G-20 agenda but also goes beyond. According to the 
Deutsche Bank Research (2010), examples of provisions beyond the G-20 agenda that the 
EU considers are the following: 
• financial transaction tax – a proposal of some EU member states to levy a tax 
on financial transactions that was disapproved at the G-20 summit but that is 
likely to be proposed at the EU level 
• bank levy – a proposal to establish ex ante resolution funds financed by levy 
imposed on banks that would be used for resolution of failed banks 
• short selling – a proposal of a draft Regulation on short selling, under which 
ESMA would be given the power to prohibit in emergency short selling in 
shares, sovereign bonds and related derivatives, and credit default swaps 
linked to government bonds 
At the time of writing these lines, neither the financial transaction tax nor the bank 
levy have been agreed upon by the finance ministers of the EU member countries. The 
Proposed Regulation on short selling is being considered by the European Parliament and 
the Council of Ministers these days and it is not expected it will come into force before 
July 2012. 
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2.4.3. United States 
Unlike in most of the European Union countries, in the U.S. the financial regulatory 
framework is not integrated into one or two institutions but rather fragmented among many 
entities. This is particularly true for the U.S. bank regulation – banks are subject to rules 
set by many authorities, both on the federal and state level. However, securities regulation, 
which is important for us, is exercised on both federal and state level by few governmental 
entities only, mostly by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
The pre-Dodd-Frank framework for the U.S. securities regulation was laid down in 
several important acts.37 The Investment Company Act of 1940 deals with regulation of 
investment companies. By the Act an “investment company” is defined as any issuer 
which: 
• is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage 
primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities; 
• is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount 
certificates of the instalment type, or has been engaged in such business and 
has any such certificate outstanding; 
• is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting, 
owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire 
investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of 
such issuer’s total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) 
on an unconsolidated basis.38 
Hence the Investment Company Act regulates companies whose primary objective is 
dealing with investing, reinvesting and trading in securities and whose own securities are 
offered to the public, including non-bank institutions, such as mutual funds. On the other 
hand, banks, insurance companies, brokers, underwriters, etc., are excluded from the force 
of the Act (Bullard, 2008). Mutual funds, one of the most popular investment options in 
the U.S., are subject to various restrictions under the Act, such as limits on leverage or 
percentage restrictions on investments into other mutual funds or hedge funds. Further, 
they must register their securities and must provide daily redemptions, hence they need to 
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be ready to satisfy investors’ demands for withdrawals by maintaining certain amount of 
cash available at all times. The Investment Company Act provides for several exemptions 
for the companies not to be considered investment companies under the Act which are not 
therefore subject to strict regulation that the Act imposes. We will discuss these 
exemptions further in Chapter 3.1.3.1. 
Under the Securities Act of 1933, every offer to sell securities must be registered 
with the SEC, unless it qualifies for an exemption from the Act. Conditions that are needed 
to be fulfilled in order to qualify for an exemption are set by so-called Regulation D.39 
Once an institution fulfils the conditions, it can sell its securities without having to register 
with the SEC. There are three exemptions from the Act given by Regulation D. The first 
one exempts offers and sales of securities of up to $1,000,000 in value within twelve 
months to accredited investors only.40 The second exemption applies for offers and sales of 
securities of up to $5,000,000 in value within twelve months to an unlimited amount of 
accredited investors and up to 35 investors who are not accredited.41 There are further 
conditions imposed within this exemption. The securities sold are restricted in a way that 
the buyer cannot resell them for six months or longer without registering the transaction. 
Finally, the third exemption refers to offers and sales of securities of an unlimited amount 
to an unlimited number of accredited investors and up to 35 investors that are not 
accredited.42 However, under this exemption, the non-accredited investors must be 
“sophisticated”, too, i.e. “they must have sufficient knowledge and experience in financial 
and business matters to make them capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the 
prospective investment”.43 The securities sold are restricted; the buyers cannot resell them 
for at least a year without registering them. Under all three exemptions, the issuers are not 
allowed to solicit or advertise the securities to the public. 
2.4.3.1. Fundamental Regulatory Change – the Dodd-Frank Act 
In July 2010, a significant legal act was passed as a regulatory response to the latest 
crisis. It was the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act by the Congress which was subsequently signed into law by the President. The Act 
reforms the U.S. regulatory framework quite radically. It addresses four areas of financial 
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regulation: the institutional framework of regulation and oversight, the prudential 
regulation of banks and other financial institutions, rules on the protection of investors, 
rules on the protection of consumers (Deutsche Bank Research, 2010). 
Among the major changes that the Act brings there are the creation of a macro-
prudential supervisory body – Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) – charged 
with identifying risks to the financial system and stability, the reform of the Fed which is 
about to be granted a central position in the regulatory and supervisory system of the U.S., 
the reform of banking supervision and the ending of the too-big-to-fail doctrine. The latter 
one consists of creation of the Orderly Liquidation Authority designed to provide a 
framework for distressed companies of systemic importance such that would discourage 
bailouts and moral hazard stemming from it. According to Deutsche Bank 
Research (2010), the approach towards too-big-to-fail institutions severely complicated the 
rescue attempts in the critical period of 2008. Similarly, new regulatory and supervisory 
institutions are to be created and some are to be discontinued as a consequence of the Act 
adoption. 
The Act devotes particular attention also to derivatives markets. Specifically, it 
imposes comprehensive regulation on swaps, including credit default swaps or securities-
based swaps.44 Since non-bank institutions such as hedge funds engage in derivatives 
trading, these regulatory provisions have a potential to indirectly affect them, too. 
The Dodd-Frank Act comprehends a strong regulatory provision – the Volcker Rule 
– aiming at lending practices and leverage ratios of many banks, since these have generally 
been considered as key risks making the financial system more and more complex. 
Volcker Rule attempts at limiting those activities of banks that are considered particularly 
risky, such as proprietary trading and hedge fund and private equity fund management. A 
bank is prohibited from proprietary trading in any form by the Act, with few exemptions, 
such as an investment in the U.S. government, state or municipal debt, etc.45 A bank’s 
investment into hedge funds or private equity funds are heavily limited. Moreover, it is 
prohibited completely from acquiring or retaining equity, partnership or ownership 
interests in hedge funds and private equity funds. Provisions of the Volcker Rule are 
supposed to become effective within two years. 
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Besides the Volcker Rule, the Dodd-Frank Act enhances capital requirements and 
leverage standards for systemically important institutions. In order for a bank to be 
considered adequately capitalised, it will need to hold 4% Tier 1 capital, 8% total capital 
and a minimum of 4% leverage ratio (Deutsche Bank Research, 2010). 
There are also other issues covered by the Act concerning comprehensive regulation 
of derivatives markets and consumer protection regulation primarily focused on the 
mortgage sector. The structure of the U.S. regulatory and supervisory system as it is 
outlined by the Dodd-Frank Act is depicted in Figure 5. 
Figure 5: New U.S. regulatory and supervisory system brought about by the Dodd-Frank Act 
 
Source: Deutsche Bank Research (2010) 
The adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act opens up new opportunities for non-bank 
financial institutions. Since the reform package is oriented heavily towards banking sector, 
no other part of the financial market will face such a regulatory burden as banks will. 
Hence the non-banks are left with a structural competitive advantage. This will be 
discussed further in the next chapter on hedge funds and private equity funds. 
The Dodd-Frank Act is a comprehensive regulatory reform package that addresses 
the G-20 agenda priorities narrowly. However, according to Deutsche Bank 
Research (2010), in certain respects the Act deviates from the G-20 consensus, or goes 
beyond. The shiniest example is the Volcker Rule which is a proposal that was not 
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embodied directly in the G-20 agenda and which represents a precedence opening up 
possibilities for other G-20 members to adopt comparably strict rules. 
For the needs of Table 3 in the next subchapter, we provide an overview of contents 
of the Dodd-Frank Act in Box 2. 
Box 2: The structure of the Dodd-Frank Act 
 
2.4.4. EU vs. U.S. Comparison 
As we have seen, the EU and the U.S. approaches to regulatory response to the crisis 
within the G-20 agenda are different in a sense that while in the U.S. the G-20 objectives 
have been addressed within one comprehensive legal act that will be implemented over the 
next few years, in the EU many individual legislative proposals reflecting the G-20 
objectives have been issued and negotiated separately. But there are further differences. 
One of them is the way of improving the institutional framework. While in the U.S. 
the reforms focus on improving the existing structures by giving more powers to the Fed, 
establishing the FSOC and reducing overlaps in competences, the EU engages in a 
systematic overhaul of the institutional framework by creation of the ESRB and the sector 
supervisory bodies EBA, ESMA and EIOPA (Deutsche Bank Research, 2010). These 
authorities represent a supervisory structure at the EU level which complements the 
regulatory frameworks of individual member states. 
The Dodd-Frank Act – Overview of the contents  
Title I   Financial Stability  
Title II   Orderly Liquidation Authority  
Title III   Transfer of Powers to the OCC, the Corporation, and the Board of Governors  
Title IV   Regulation of Advisers to Hedge Funds and Others  
Title V   Insurance  
Title VI   Improvements to Regulation of Bank and Savings Association, Holding Companies and 
Depository Institutions  
Title VII  Wall Street Transparency and Accountability  
Title VIII  Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision  
Title IX   Investor Protections and Improvements  
Title X   Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection  
Title XI   Federal Reserve System Provisions  
Title XII  Improving Access to Mainstream Financial Institutions  
Title XIII  Pay It Back Act  
Title XIV  Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act  
Title XV  Miscellaneous Provisions  
Title XVI  Section 1256 Contracts 
Source: Deutsche Bank Research (2010) 
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Another difference, for us very relevant, lies in the attitude towards alternative 
investment vehicles. EU rules for hedge funds and private equity funds in their final form 
are stricter than the rules set by the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. The AIFM Directive 
covers a wide range of AIFs and deals with a broad scale of regulatory issues, among 
which there are macro and micro-prudential risks, market efficiency, investor protection 
and corporate governance (Deutsche Bank Research, 2010). 
Further, the two measures differ in the compensation issues. While the Dodd-Frank 
Act sets broad principles for balancing risks and rewards and involves shareholders more 
in the decision-making process on compensation schemes, the negotiated EU regulatory 
proposals are much more detailed with respect to compensation schemes (Deutsche Bank 
Research, 2010). 
Moreover, differences in the EU and U.S. approaches are likely to widen even 
further, since both the EU and the U.S. inquire into provisions beyond the G-20 agenda. 
Generally, this development is, however, not appreciated due to the high degree of 
economic interdependence and mutual political objectives of the EU and the U.S. which 
would benefit more from joint economic and regulatory solutions (Deutsche Bank 
Research, 2010). 
In Table 3, we provide an illustrative comparison of provisions undertaken by both 
the EU and the U.S. addressing the objectives of the G-20 agenda. The difference between 
the approaches mentioned in the first paragraph of this subchapter is obvious. 
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Table 3: Implementing the G20 agenda – US and EU in comparison (passages in italics denote EU measures 
already adopted, U.S. legislation items refer to the Dodd-Frank Act, see Box 2) 
 
Source: Deutsche Bank Research (2010) 
  
Measure Adoption
COM(2009) 499 – European Systemic Risk Board 2010 Title I
COM(2009) 501 – European Banking Authority 2010 Title III
COM(2009) 502 – European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 2010
COM(2009) 503 – European Securities and Markets Authority 2010
COM(2009) 576 – Omnibus Directive 2010
Basel capital framework CRD II – Liquidity buffers 2009 Title VI
CRD III – Trading book and securitisation 2010
CRD IV – Bank capital, leverage ratio, liquidity buffers, counter-cyclicality End-2010
Accounting standards IAS Regulation 1126/2008 – Adoption of International Accounting Standards 2008 Title VI
Endorsement of IASB Standards Ongoing
Compensation Recommendations on remuneration of Directors and financial services – sound principles 2009 Title VI
CRD III 2009
AIFM End-2010
Solvency II, Level 2 2011
Un-specified measures on non-banking financial services 2011
CRD II – liquidity risk, large exposures 2009 Title VI
CRD III – securitisation, due diligence, retention 2010
CRD IV – counterparty risk End-2010
Insurance Level 2 – governance, internal control, risk management 2011 Title V
Corporate governance Green paper 2010
OTC derivatives EMIR – mandatory clearing 2011 Title VIII
CRD IV – capital requirements from non-CCP transactions End-2010
MiFID review 2011
MAD review End-2010
Bank resolution Unspecified measure based on forthcoming FSB recommendations 2011 Title II
Deposit insurance Immediate changes to Deposit Guarantee Directive 94/19/EC 2009 Title VI
Overhaul of Deposit Guarantee Directive 94/19/EC 2011-2012 Title VII
Overhaul of Investor Compensation Scheme Directive (97/9/EC) 2011-2012 Title IX
White Paper on Insurance Guarantee Schemes 2011-2012 Title XII
Title XIV
HF, PE AIFM 2011 Title IV
Credit rating agencies CRA Regulation 1060/2009 2009 Title IX
Amendment of CRA Regulation 2011
Macroprudential risks 
and financial oversight
EU legislationG-20 commitment US legislation
Bank risk management 
and internal controls
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3. Hedge Funds and Private Equity During the Global Crisis 
In our further discussion, we will consider two types of alternative investment 
vehicles that are very hot issues nowadays. They are the hedge funds and the private equity 
funds. These two types of investment vehicles have become very much interconnected 
over time. Private equity groups own many hedge funds or invest in long-term investments 
in hedge funds. Similarly, hedge funds often join private equity groups to undertake large 
buyouts hoping that they can boost their performance in this way (O’Brien, 2008).46 
Before discussing the role of hedge funds and private equity funds in the latest global 
crisis, first let us define them and sum up their basic features, purposes and functioning. In 
the first subchapter, the basic characteristics of hedge funds are discussed, in the second 
subchapter the same will be done for the private equity funds. Further in this chapter, the 
regulatory issues will be analyzed and lastly, we will discuss the performance of both types 
of funds in the latest financial crisis. 
3.1. Hedge Funds 
Hedge funds belong to the group of contractual savings institutions and are treated as 
a special type of a mutual fund. Institutions of this type pool funds from investors which 
are then managed by professional fund managers.47 An important characteristic of such 
entities is that the risk of loss from unfavourable price movements is borne by the investors 
themselves (Carmichael and Pomerleano, 2002). For our purposes, however, the general 
definition of contractual savings institutions is not enough, so we will try to find a more 
appropriate one concerning hedge funds specifically. 
Unfortunately, there is no uniform generally accepted definition of what a hedge 
fund is. For example, the U.S. President Working Group on Financial Markets (1999) 
defined a hedge fund as “any pooled investment vehicle that is privately organized, 
administered by professional investment managers, and not widely available to the 
public”.48 This definition differentiates hedge funds from public investment companies; 
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 O’Brien (2008) also mentions a risk for hedge funds stemming from investing in private equity, since they 
usually invest short-term, while private equity investment is long-term and illiquid, thus posing risk for 
hedge funds in case their investors decide to withdraw money. 
47
 In American literature, fund managers are often referred to as “advisers” to a fund. 
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 U.S. President Working Group on Financial Markets (1999), pp. 1 
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however, it does not encompass the typical features of hedge funds that make them 
different from other alternative investment vehicles (ECB, 2005).49 It is merely a definition 
appropriate for more possibilities, among others for private equity funds which we will 
discuss later on. 
More appropriate is the definition by the ECB (2009) which recognises a hedge fund 
as “any collective investment undertaking, regardless of its legal structure under national 
laws, which applies relatively unconstrained investment strategies to achieve positive 
absolute returns, and whose managers, in addition to management fees, are remunerated 
in relation to the fund’s performance”.50 This definition already captures the distinctive 
features of hedge funds, especially the wide scope of investment strategies and instruments 
they can use in their trading and the general incentive scheme of the managers. 
ECB (2005) further lists several other features describing hedge funds, some of them 
directly or indirectly mentioned in either of the previous definitions.  
• accredited investors 
There are rules on who can invest in the fund, since it gathers investments 
from a relatively small number of big investors. These must be accredited by 
the fund. The accreditation is given to a high net worth investor, individual or 
institutional, whose planned investment reaches certain minimum 
requirement. The logic behind the restrictions imposed upon the investors is 
that “wealthy individuals and large institutions are sophisticated enough to 
understand the risks involved with the investments that the hedge fund is 
undertaking, and that they would not be devastated by large losses”.51 Fund 
managers often invest a substantial amount of their own money as a personal 
stake into the fund in order to gain credibility in the eyes of investors. 
• managerial and performance fees 
Managers charge managerial and performances fees, the former one, also 
known as the asset-based fee, being a percentage of the fund’s net asset value, 
while the latter one being a percentage of the fund’s profit. The latter one, 
often referred to as “carried interest”, is another defining feature of a hedge 
fund. 
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 Prabhu (2001), pp. 4 
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• infrequent redemptions 
Hedge fund managers predefine dates when investors only may withdraw 
their money. Usually, there are no redemption periods during the first year; 
investors are locked-in over the first year of their investment. Nevertheless, 
the lock-in periods are still very short relatively to e.g. private equity funds. 
A short lock-in acts as a substitute for the ability of the fund’s investors to 
resell their interests in the fund, since such resale is prohibited by the 
Regulation D’s Rule 506 (Oesterle, 2006). These infrequent redemption 
periods might, however, be further postponed under exceptional 
circumstances in order to protect funds from runs. 
• lack of regulation 
Most importantly, hedge funds are not subject to as strict a regulation by the 
financial supervisory authorities as other financial institutions. Their 
managers are not usually obliged to be registered with the appropriate 
regulatory authority. The funds are either virtually unregulated due to their 
offshore domicile or regulated very lightly in case they are onshore 
institutions.  
• leverage 
The more money to invest, the higher the returns – hence hedge funds do not 
only invest money they have from the investors but they are usually also 
heavily leveraged. The debt/equity ratio tends to be rather high, relatively to 
other types of financial institutions, since hedge funds are less restricted in 
the use of leverage by very loose regulation that applies to them. 
• variety of investment strategies 
The lack of regulation facilitates the broad range of investment strategies and 
possibilities for the hedge fund’s manager to choose from, which is one of the 
most typical features of this institution.52 They often include the use of 
hedging techniques. Moreover, there are no rules about portfolio 
diversification concerning hedge funds, unlike e.g. mutual funds. Hence 
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hedge fund managers are free to invest huge amounts in one direction only, 
boosting the bet even more via employing the leverage. 
The use of hedging techniques is the very feature that gave hedge funds their name. 
Usually, they consist of combining long and short positions when dealing with 
commodities or stocks, so that the funds’ bets on the price moves are hedged. A general 
strategy of the funds is thus to generate returns regardless of whether the market rises or 
falls (Financial Times, 2005). 
But nowadays it is not only about hedging techniques anymore. Hedge fund 
managers typically look for market inefficiencies which they could exploit in order to 
generate returns, and hence invest not only in stocks or commodities but also in bonds, 
options, currencies, derivatives, arbitrage, real estate or in different combinations of the 
above (White, 2005), or in even more unconventional investments such as aircraft leasing 
or direct lending (Cantrell, 2005). According to Oesterle (2006), a significant part of the 
hedge funds’ recent success can be attributed to their freedom from regulations on 
formation, organization and trading practices. However, hedge funds sometimes invest 
large amounts of money in one single position only, unlike mutual funds for example, 
whose portfolios are usually very diversified (Chandler, 2006). 
Nevertheless, since recently there has been a trend in the hedge fund industry of 
setting up hedge funds in line with the EU law on regulation of the UCITS funds (so-called 
“UCITS hedge funds”). It mostly applies to European funds, since the law requires a 
UCITS fund to be domiciled in the EU, but also U.S. funds are joining the trend. The 
advantage of restructuring a fund operation according to the UCITS structure is the 
possibility to access retail investors and institutional investors who cannot afford investing 
in a traditional hedge fund. According to Jones (2010), UCITS hedge funds now account 
for approx. 7% of the total hedge fund industry. The UCITS disadvantages consist in the 
requirements of high liquidity, transparency and portfolio diversification and in limits on 
investments in particular instruments. 
Besides hedge fund themselves, so-called “funds of hedge funds” (FOHFs) are not 
uncommon among financial institutions. They are a special type of hedge funds that 
distribute investments of their investors over a diversified portfolio of other hedge funds, 
usually five to fifty of them (Pozen, 2006). FOHFs usually require much lower minimum 
investments than ordinary hedge funds (tens of thousands of USD vs. millions of USD) 
and in the U.S. most of their managers are registered with the SEC. 
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In the above mentioned list of hedge fund features there are several ones that deserve 
closer attention. To begin, it is the manager remuneration issue. As we have already 
mentioned, a manager’s income from running a hedge fund comprises two components – a 
managerial fee and a performance fee (carried interest). Managerial fee is a percentage of 
the net asset value of the investments in the fund, usually up to 2%. Performance fee is a 
percentage of the fund’s annual profit, usually around 20%. However, after the debacle 
hedge fund performance in 2008, fee structure has been pushed down. This is especially 
true for smaller funds which manage up to $100 million with not very excellent record, 
since these funds have largely used the strategy of decreasing the remuneration fees in 
order to compensate their clients for problems experienced since 2008, such as suspended 
redemptions, low returns, etc. (The Economist, 2009).53 In this point of view, FOHFs 
account for a specific issue. They have typically charged fees under the 1/10 structure on 
top of fees levied by individual funds in the portfolio. But after 2008 there has been a steep 
downshift. The Economist (2010) reports the 10% average FOHF performance fee in 2007 
to shift to an average of 6.5% in 2009. 
While managerial (asset-based) fees are earned on an ongoing basis and are stable 
with respect to the value of the fund’s portfolio, performance fees are highly unstable.54 
Moreover, their economic characteristics are very much different. As Bullard (2008) 
explains, if a there is a 10% decline in the value of a hedge fund portfolio along with a 
10% increase in assets under management of the fund, i.e. new funds from the investors, 
the asset-based fee remains unchanged, while the carried interest will be decreased by the 
decline of the portfolio, with increase of assets having no effect. 
There are devices often applied on performance fees, such as high water marks or 
hurdle rates.55 These are meant to align the managers’ incentives with those of the 
investors and thus gain the confidence of the investors that the fund will not use their 
money for volatile investments. However, from the systemic point of view, these devices 
together with the nature of the remuneration structure itself are relatively dangerous in a 
                                                           
53
 Managerial and performance fees usually used to be referred to as the 2/20 structure, however, 
according to The Economist (2009), nowadays they are likely to approach the 1/10 rather than the 2/20 
structure. 
54
 In case of a steep and sudden decline in the value of the portfolio, carried interest will fall dramatically, 
while the asset-based fee will be affected much less severely, see Bullard (2008). 
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 High water mark principle means that the performance fee is only paid to the manager if the fund’s profit 
exceeds the highest previously achieved level. If it does not, no performance fee is paid. Hurdle rate is a 
benchmark over which the fund’s profit must ascend for the performance fee to be paid to the manager. 
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sense that they impose incentives upon the managers to look for high-profit, therefore 
risky, investments. 
Another issue worth devoting attention to is the following. We have noted that in bad 
times hedge fund managers may lock in their investors for longer than for the first year 
only. These are then usually not allowed to withdraw their money until markets settle and 
fund managers may sell their assets at reasonable prices. This measure is meant to protect 
funds from losses stemming from underpriced selling due to runs. In a way, it also protects 
markets from excess volatility that would otherwise occur. Actually, not so long ago, 
redemptions were suspended by many funds after the burnout of the subprime crisis in 
2007.56 
3.1.1. The Hedge Fund Market57 
The hedge fund industry consists not only of hedge funds themselves but also of 
providers of services to hedge funds. Prime brokers, external fund administrators, 
custodians and auditors are all important parts of the hedge fund market. Prime brokers 
provide hedge funds with services such as financing, clearing and settlement of trades, 
securities lending for short selling, cash lending to support leverage, risk management, etc. 
Since both leverage and short selling declined significantly as a result of the downturn and 
redemptions of 2008, prime brokers were affected largely. External fund administrators 
take care of accounting or risk analysis issues up to the extent which the hedge fund 
management decides to be performed by a third party. Custodians hold and manage hedge 
fund assets, both cash and securities. Finally, auditors perform optional audits. 
The structure of sources of funds keeps on changing towards institutional investors. 
While at the end of previous decade, high net worth individuals with 54% accounted for 
the majority of funds raised, over the recent decade their share on total funds has been 
declining, ending up at 26% in 2009. 
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Figure 6: Structure of a typical hedge fund (dashed line stands for an optional relationship) 
 
Source: IFSL (2010) 
Since hedge funds may be domiciled both in onshore or offshore locations, the 
majority of funds operating in the market take the advantage of being registered in a more 
convenient tax or regulatory framework. Hence 60% of hedge funds were registered 
offshore in 2009. On the contrary, the EU registered only 5% of global hedge funds. 
Despite their place of registration, however, management of hedge funds mostly resides in 
onshore locations. Thus, New York and London are the biggest centres of hedge fund 
management, the former managing 41% and the latter 20% of global hedge fund assets. 
Over the recent decade, hedge fund industry has grown rapidly. While at the turn of 
the millennia there were approx. 4,800 funds operating worldwide with total assets under 
management accounting for slightly over $400 billion, in 2007 at the peak before the fall 
the market witnessed 10,500 hedge funds managing $2.15 trillion. Subsequently, there was 
a significant fall both in assets under management as well as in absolute number of funds 
due to high hedge fund attrition rates (Figure 14) as a consequence of the severe global 
financial market downturn. However, according to IFSL (2010), in the second half of 
2009, the number of new funds launched exceeded the number of liquidations and the 
amount of total assets under management increased again, too. See Figure 7 for an 
overview of the development of the hedge fund industry over the decade. 
 Figure 7: Hedge fund market development 
Source: TheCityUK 
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Table 5: Largest hedge funds (January 2010) 
Hedge Fund $ billion 
  1. JP Morgan 50.4 
  2. Bridgewater Associates 43.6 
  3. Paulson & Co. 32.0 
  4. Brevan Howard Asset Management LLP 27.9 
  5. Soros Fund Management 27.0 
  6. D.E. Shaw Group 23.6 
  7. Och-Ziff Capital Management Group 23.5 
  8. Baupost Group 21.8 
  9. Man AHL 21.7 
10. Angelo, Gordon & Co. 20.8 
Source: TheCityUK 
3.1.3. Hedge Funds Regulation 
3.1.3.1. Pre-Dodd-Frank Framework 
In this subchapter, we are going to describe the pre-crisis hedge fund regulatory 
framework. As we have already mentioned for many times, hedge funds are not subject to 
regulatory requirements imposed on many other investment vehicles. Let us illustrate the 
difference on the comparison of requirements put on U.S. mutual funds and hedge funds. 
Mutual funds are subject to disclosure requirements such as filing quarterly reports to 
the SEC on the securities they own and semi-annual reports to shareholders on their 
operations, limits on capital structure, leverage and performance fees, they must meet 
diversification requirements. In all these aspects, on the contrary, pre-crisis hedge funds 
were free (Anderson, 2006a). Still, it is necessary to mention that the U.S. hedge funds, 
both registered and unregistered, have always been subject to antifraud provisions of 
securities laws. Under these provisions, summed up, hedge fund managers are prohibited 
from making false statements of material information or using misleading materials when 
they deal with their investors or counterparties.58 However, they used to have the 
possibility to qualify for an exemption from the registration and disclosure requirements of 
the four federal securities laws, namely the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and the Investment Company Act of 
1940 (Shadab, 2007). 
The exemption from the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 set a fund manager free 
from the registration duty if he had had fewer than fifteen clients during the preceding 
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twelve months. Further, he was prohibited from holding himself out generally to the public 
as an investment adviser or acting as an investment adviser to any registered investment 
company.59 
As we have already mentioned in the previous chapter, exemptions from the 
Securities Act of 1933 are set by the legislature known as Regulation D. Under the Rule 
506 of this provision institutions can offer their securities in an unlimited amount without 
the need to register as long as they sell them to accredited investors (= individuals with net 
worth of at least $1 million or with an annual income of at least $200,000, or a company of 
at least $5 million in assets)60 or to a maximum of 35 non-accredited but sophisticated 
investors. 
To qualify for an exemption from the Investment Company Act of 1940, under 
which mutual funds are regulated, either of the following two conditions must be fulfilled: 
(1) the company has not more than one hundred investors61, or (2) the company only sells 
its securities to “qualified purchasers”62 (= individuals who own at least $5 million in 
investments or institutions with at least $25 million in investments)63. Usually the second 
option is chosen by hedge funds, in order to increase the available number of potential 
investors. 
Combining the conditions for the two above mentioned exemptions, we can see why 
hedge funds offer and sell their securities to accredited investors only. Further, they usually 
take care of not having more than 499 investors in order to avoid the securities registration 
duty and subsequent regular disclosure statements duty imposed by the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.64 
The drawbacks of the exemptions are that under all the Investment Advisers Act 
exemption from the fund manager registration duty, the Regulation D exemption from the 
securities registration duty and the Investment Company Act exemption from being 
considered an investment company an advertising limit is imposed on the unregistered 
funds. Hence the drawback of not being registered with the regulatory authority under 
these acts is that the unregistered hedge funds cannot freely advertise their activities to the 
general public and only can attract investors with a potential to be accredited. Interestingly 
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enough, the advertising limits form an implicit self-regulatory incentive, since the hedge 
fund managers “are regulated by the fact that if you make a mistake, you can be put out of 
business”.65 
But is self-regulation enough? The lack of regulation imposed on hedge funds by the 
regulatory authorities is a very controversial issue. By many, they are believed to “benefit 
the economy by mitigating price downturns, bearing risks that others will not, making 
securities more liquid, and ferreting out inefficiencies”66 which is only possible due to 
much less regulation than other investment companies are subject to (Shadab, 2007). 
Indeed, according to Lutton (2008), there are two factors to which the “light-touch nature” 
of the hedge fund regulation can be attributed. Firstly, hedge funds target “sophisticated 
investors”, a category of investors under which the institutional or high net worth 
individuals are understood, who are resourced and experienced enough to be able to assess 
risks on their own, hence there is no need to impose additional regulation on the 
institutions. Other investors than the sophisticated ones are excluded by high minimum 
investment volumes required by the funds. Secondly, there is a belief that by light 
regulatory zones competitiveness of the financial sector is enhanced. The latter argument is 
supported also by Wymeersch (2005) who cites hedge funds as an example of financial 
innovations which take place outside of strictly regulated areas. Further, Wymeersch 
claims that “there is a strong argument in favour of maintaining unregulated or lightly 
regulated zones, where new developments could take place, provided these do not 
jeopardize the overall confidence in the market and do not create a danger to the 
unsophisticated investor”.67 
On the other hand, over recent years there has been a large boom in the number of 
hedge funds operating worldwide which is mostly attributed to the fact that many “less 
sophisticated”, i.e. small and less resourced, investors have started participating in the 
hedge fund industry. This trend of an increasing number of retail investors qualifying as 
accredited investors is known as retailization of hedge funds. Minimum investment 
requirements needed for an accreditation have decreased with the increasing number of 
entrants into the hedge fund industry that compete for investors (U.S. SEC, 2003). Hence 
serious concerns have been raised that hedge funds are too lightly regulated, since retail 
and unsophisticated investors “may not possess the understanding or market power to 
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engage a hedge fund adviser to provide the necessary information to make an informed 
investment decision“.68 In addition, the problem is further magnified by the activities of the 
FOHFs, since these institutions require much lower minimum investments to qualify for 
accredited investors, hence they are much more affordable for smaller investors. As 
U.S. SEC (2003) remarks, although most of them in the U.S. being registered themselves, 
FOHFs are likely to experience problems with reliable calculations of their net asset 
values, since these are based on the underlying hedge funds, usually unregistered, to whose 
portfolio holdings the FOHFs do not have access.69 
There are some other concerns that promote discussions over hedge fund regulation. 
Desmet (2008) names four of them. Firstly, it is the leverage and high concentration. As 
has already been mentioned, high leverage strategies are usually employed by fund 
managers, which are moreover connected to investing into very few positions.70 Secondly, 
conflicts of interest have been recognised either in a way of consultants or brokers 
affiliated with a particular hedge fund attracting investors for this fund or in a way of 
auditors affiliated with the fund who thus cannot check the accounting independently. 
Thirdly, Desmet names a concern of hedge fund activism, i.e. making use of equity 
holdings in companies to affect their strategy in order to raise the stock price. The effect of 
hedge fund activism is however ambiguous. On one hand, these efforts are driven by a 
vision of short-term profit and not of long-term health of the company. On the other hand, 
it might be favourable for underperforming companies to go through changes and to have 
the mispricing of securities corrected (see e.g. Chandler, 2006). And fourthly, cases of 
frauds concerning hedge funds have been reported which could be prevented more 
efficiently if additional regulation enabled regulators to do so, e.g. through stricter 
disclosure requirements. 
3.1.3.2. Recent attempts at the improvement of the framework 
In light of the intensified discussions over the subject, there have actually been 
attempts at imposing additional regulation on the U.S. as well as European hedge funds 
during recent years. On the next few pages, we provide a list of the proposed or adopted 
measures with their descriptions. 
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A. Hedge Fund Rule 
In 2004, the SEC adopted the so-called Hedge Fund Rule which required most hedge 
fund managers to register as investment advisers.71 Indeed, the SEC assumed that not the 
fund itself but every single investor of a hedge fund was the client of the fund’s manager. 
Hence managers suddenly had more than fourteen clients; therefore they did not qualify for 
the exemption from the Investment Adviser Act of 1940 anymore and were required to be 
registered with the SEC effective February 1, 2006. As Desmet (2008) summarizes the 
effects, once hedge fund managers were registered as investment advisers, they had to 
adopt codes of ethics with expected standards of conduct, maintain certain books and 
records. Further, the SEC was entitled to review the fund’s internal controls and 
procedures and examine their adequacy. However, many things were about to stay the 
same after managers would have registered. For example, registration did not require 
providing of performance statistics (Pozen, 2006). Neither imposed it any limits on the 
variety of investment strategies, diversification issues (heavily under-diversified portfolio 
is not exceptional), leverage ratios or performance fees (Anderson, 2006a). Although the 
original intention of the SEC only was to have some oversight of the hedge fund managers’ 
activity and to enhance the possibility of detecting fraud which they had planned to 
achieve by the adoption of the Hedge Fund Rule, the question is whether benefits of the 
hedge fund manager registration for the society would have been worth the additional cost 
burden imposed on the funds, and subsequently on their investors. Namely, registration 
would not have led to any systemic risk prevention, since the Hedge Fund Rule, as it was 
adopted, was of no effect with respect to issues such as leverage or diversification. 
Importantly, according to Glassman & Atkins (2004), the commissioners who 
dissented from the proposal from the very beginning, the Hedge Fund Rule did not even 
address the original intentions of the SEC, i.e. to protect investors from being defrauded. 
The authors argued on the following grounds. Firstly, a “typical” hedge fund fraud, based 
on the cases investigated by the SEC during the preceding years, was committed either by 
a manager too small to be registered, or by a manager already registered. Further, mutual 
fund managers were registered and still abuses took place which had not been revealed by 
the SEC examiners. Secondly, although retailization of hedge funds was agreed upon to be 
a problem, a revision of the accreditation criteria for investors rather than registration of 
hedge fund managers would have been a solution. Thirdly, Glassman and Atkins 
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questioned the scope of the Hedge Fund Rule, since, on principle, it did not address hedge 
funds exclusively. Rather it targeted “private funds” with a lock-up period of up to two 
years.72 Then, a manager could have lengthened the lock-up period, and some really did so, 
to evade the effect the Rule, which would have harmed the investors. And fourthly, the 
investors would have to carry the costs of registration alongside the costs they exercised to 
do their own research, since the information on the fund’s performance obtained when 
managers were registered was not enough. Further, the Hedge Fund Rule imposed 
substantial costs also on the SEC itself. As the authors say, “if we fail to devote adequate 
resources and develop the necessary expertise to carry out effective risk-based 
examinations, we are providing a false sense of security by suggesting to the marketplace 
that, through registration, we have bathed hedge funds in ‘sunlight’”.73 
Anyway, the life of the Hedge Fund Rule was not long. In June 2006, it was vacated 
and remanded by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, since the 
Court stated that the client of a hedge fund manager is the fund itself, and not the fund’s 
investors.74 By that time, hundreds of managers had registered. After the decision, they 
were allowed to deregister if they wished so. However, the vast majority of hedge fund 
managers remained registered; the SEC reported an increase in the number of registered 
hedge fund managers even after the Hedge Fund Rule was struck down. According to 
Grant (2006), the reason for that was the potential market advantage of remaining 
registered, since it was likely to help hedge funds to attract institutional investors who 
gained confidence from the oversight that the registration provided. 
After the bad success of the Hedge Fund Rule, the SEC continued in its efforts to 
gain some oversight over the alternative investment vehicles. Hence in 2007, a new 
regulatory measure was adopted, which was referred to as Prohibition of Fraud by 
Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles.75 According to this Rule, it is forbidden 
for “any investment adviser to a pooled investment vehicle to make an untrue statement of 
a material fact to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled investment vehicle, or 
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made to any 
investor or prospective investor in the pooled investment vehicle, in the light of the 
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circumstances under which they were made, not misleading”76, since any such activity is 
considered to be fraudulent and deceptive. Importantly enough, the rule applies to all 
managers of pooled investment vehicles, whether registered with the SEC or not. Thus 
managers of hedge funds, private equity funds, mutual funds, etc., are all subject to the 
New Antifraud Rule. 
B. Dodd-Frank Act 
In Chapter 2.4.3.1 we have already discussed the brand new regulatory package of 
legislature known as the Dodd-Frank Act. The adoption of the Act is likely to have broad 
consequences both for hedge funds and private equity. The immediate effect is the 
obligation to register with the SEC for all hedge funds (as well as private equity funds) 
with more than $150 million of assets and further to be subject to periodic inspections by 
SEC examiners. The funds will further have to report financial data to the SEC. Once the 
SEC founds a fund too large or too risky, it will be placed under the Fed supervision 
(Deutsche Bank Research, 2010). The Act does not specify any prudential rules or rules on 
business conduct. But the SEC is given a broad mandate to expand its regulatory powers 
over the hedge fund industry in the future. 
The Dodd-Frank Act also affects hedge funds via its derivatives market section. 
According to Petajisto (2010), a hedge fund which trades OTC derivatives might be 
regarded as a “major swap participant”, which is likely to result in being subject to 
additional regulation within the derivatives section of the Act upon the discretion of a 
regulator. 
As has been already mentioned, the Dodd-Frank Act contains a special provision on 
banks named the Volcker Rule. It also affects alternative investment vehicles significantly, 
since it prohibits banks from proprietary trading and, in particular, limits banks’ 
investments in hedge funds and private equity funds. Namely, banks are prohibited from 
acquiring or retaining equity, partnership or ownership interests in hedge funds and private 
equity funds with the exception of certain specified investments in hedge funds or private 
equity funds not exceeding 3% of the total ownership of the fund within one year of the 
investment, and 3% of the bank’s Tier 1 Capital (Deutsche Bank Research, 2010). Thus, 
banks which are engaged in a hedge fund or proprietary trading activity will have to either 
terminate such an activity or spin it off to an independent entity. The Volcker Rule is 
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expected to be fully implemented within a relatively long period of time – combination of 
transition periods during which banks will conform their activities to the Rule might 
postpone the effective date by up to twelve years. 
As we have denoted in the previous chapter, a strong orientation of the Dodd-Frank 
Act towards banking institutions and a relatively heavy regulatory burden that it imposes 
upon them are likely to create a significant competitive advantage for non-bank financial 
institutions which are not about to suffer from such strong regulatory provisions. Hedge 
funds and private equity funds are a very illustrative example. Although under new rules 
they are subject to stricter regulation than they were before, they still have been left out of 
the new comprehensive regulatory measures imposed on banks. Thus, they are likely to 
benefit from the fact that banks will be forbidden to engage in proprietary trading. Further, 
since banks will be prohibited from hedge fund and private equity activities and will have 
to spin these activities off to independent units if they decide not to terminate them 
completely, the funds’ direct competitors in the market will be weakened (Deutsche Bank 
Research, 2010). 
C. Europe 
In the UK, the way of policing and regulating hedge funds is different. According to 
Anderson (2006b), both UK and U.S. hedge fund managers and other experts consider the 
British model to have distinct advantages over the SEC attempts. In the UK, all hedge 
funds are subject to registration and regulation and their managers are authorized by the 
FSA (FSA, 2009). During the authorization process, which might take up to six months, 
a fund is assigned an individual regulator who examines its business plan and people in 
charge of various functions of the fund, and after the authorization is granted, the fund has 
to hand in regular risk assessments (Anderson, 2006b). To sum up, the UK model relies on 
frequent communication between hedge funds and regulators. In this way, the FSA 
maintains the basic oversight that the SEC has been yearning for since the original 
adoption of the Hedge Fund Rule. 
The extent of regulation differs largely among EU member states. Many of them, 
similarly to the U.S., do not impose such a strict regulation on hedge funds. However, 
given the high leverage nature of hedge funds, they are alleged by the EU authorities to be 
dangerous not only for non-banks, but also for the banking sector, since many investment 
banks as well as commercial banks have engaged in the hedge fund investment. 
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For this reason, the De Larosière Group (2009), among many other things in their 
report, recommends to adopt a set of regulatory measures with respect to hedge funds for 
all the EU member states (as well as for the U.S.) comparable to those used in the UK. The 
Group claims that hedge funds did not play a major role in the emergence of the latest 
turmoil in the financial markets, regarding the fact that the initial causes of the crisis 
consisted in mortgage banking and excess leverage. Nevertheless, they are of the view that 
it is widely agreed that the highly leveraged hedge funds contributed to high market 
volatility and they also had a transmission function (selling of shares) after the crisis broke 
out. Hence they require adequate capital requirements to be set, reporting obligations to be 
applied in order to assess the degree of leverage of hedge funds, and incentives inducing 
excessive risk taking (structure of bonuses) to be rectified.77 Further, the Group calls for 
higher transparency, for registration of funds and for assessing their strategies, methods 
and leverage, since banks as the main lenders to hedge funds “have not been able to obtain 
a global view of the risks they were engaging in”.78 Lastly, very strict capital requirements 
and close monitoring should be applied to banks owning a hedge fund (or a private equity 
fund).79 
FSA discusses the applicability of regulation of hedge funds via the Turner Review 
(FSA, 2009). The report says hedge funds are subject neither to capital adequacy nor 
liquidity regulation because their activities are not bank-like. The authors state that, on 
average, leverage of hedge funds is lower than leverage of banks. Further, hedge funds do 
not provide direct services to retail customers, neither they allow investors to withdraw 
their money until a specified redemption date comes. Hence they “are not performing a 
maturity transformation function fully equivalent to that performed by banks…”80 On the 
other hand, FSA admits that hedge fund aggregate activity might have a pro-cyclical effect 
on the economy in a way that in times of economic distress funds tend to deleverage in 
order to be able to meet investors’ demands for redemptions. In this way, prices of 
securities are pushed down, as was the case in the early stages of the latest crisis. Hence, 
some kind of regulation seems to be in place. In addition, as the FSA in its Turner Review 
alerts, it is possible that in the future hedge funds will develop into more bank-like 
institutions with greater systemic importance in terms of their scale, leverage or customer 
premises, and the regulatory framework should be able to recognize and respond to this 
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development soon enough. The Review offers a comparison to the situation of the U.S. 
investment banks which were probably not systemically important during the 1970s and 
1980s; nevertheless, they have gradually developed into crucial ones to the financial 
system. Regulatory framework has not noticed this development and the results 
materialised in 2007… 
Thus, changes reflecting the latest financial development recommended by the FSA 
in the Turner Review include two points: (1) regulatory authorities need to collect much 
wider range of information on hedge fund activities and need to take into account potential 
macro-prudential risks stemming from the information, and (2) the authorities need the 
power to impose prudential regulation on hedge funds if they spot the funds’ activity have 
become bank-like in nature or systemically important, as described in the previous 
paragraph.81 
The aforementioned reports create grounds on which the EU regulatory framework 
for AIFs will be restructured. Namely, as has already been discussed in Chapter 2.4.2.2, 
the European Commission proposed a set of new regulatory measures – the AIMF 
Directive – which was adopted in 2010 and came into force in early 2011. Let us briefly 
review its main consequences for the European hedge fund industry. Following the UK 
model, the Directive establishes an obligation to register for all hedge fund managers 
managing more than €100 million of assets. The same threshold applies for the disclosure 
of systemically relevant data to regulatory authorities. Further, the concept of the “EU 
passport” for managers that once have been authorized in either of the member states is 
also a part of the Directive. However, provisions concerning the third country marketing 
that are included in the AIFM Directive are rather protectionist and are very likely to make 
the non-EU funds as well as EU funds managed by non-EU fund managers unavailable for 
EU investors, thus leaving them worse off and decreasing the competitiveness of the whole 
EU economy.82 In addition, ESMA’s powers to intervene in the marketing of funds or to 
impose limits on their leverage will be substantially increased. 
3.1.3.3. Case Study: Systemic Risk of Hedge Funds 
Let us move the discussion to the level of systemic risk, since the main economic 
argument for regulating hedge funds is their alleged potential to create systemic risk 
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(Petajisto, 2010). According to the FSA (2010), hedge funds might carry potential systemic 
risk via two channels. Firstly, the credit channel brings the risk of destabilizing the 
systematically important investors in case of losses on the fund’s investments, since these 
are borne by the fund’s creditors. Secondly, the market channel represents the risk of 
market volatility increased by the activity of hedge funds, since their joint impact might 
drive asset prices upwards in good times and downwards due to forced selling in bad 
ones.83 
There are other authors who consider hedge funds being potentially dangerous to the 
system. For example, Schwarcz (2008) sees them bearing greater systemic risk potential 
than many other business institutions. He states this is largely because hedge funds 
managers “aggressively seek above market profits and quick returns and employ investing 
strategies that may converge”.84 
The FSA’s credit channel of hedge fund alleged systemic risk potential refers to the 
counterparty risk inherent in virtually all financial transactions. One of the ways of dealing 
with the credit channel is an imposition of stricter rules with respect to engaging in 
business with AIFs on hedge funds’ major creditors which themselves might be 
systemically important, e.g. banks or pension funds. We believe this way of settling the 
problem is more efficient than imposing direct regulation on hedge funds. 
The market channel refers to the problem hedge funds are often blamed for, namely 
that their effort to quickly deleverage increases price volatility in the markets after an 
adverse market development has taken place. This has been the case after the latest crisis 
broke out. Let us analyse this issue a little bit more. We will have a look at rates of return 
of various hedge fund strategies over the last twelve years and thereout we will try to 
derive a conclusion whether there is a systemic risk incorporated in the functioning of 
hedge funds or not. 
• Hypothesis 3: Rates of return of various hedge fund strategies are strongly 
correlated. 
To analyse the hypothesis, we will use the following data: 
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Table 6: HFRI indices of annual investment returns of hedge fund strategies 
 
Source:  
 
The HFRI indices are equally weighted performance indices utilized globally as an 
industry benchmark. HFRI Fund Weighted Composite comprises over 2,000 funds, both 
onshore and offshore, with either more than $50 million of assets under management or 
with a track record of at least twelve months, with no FOHFs involved. On the contrary, 
HFRI FoF Composite includes 650 FOHFs with other conditions equal. Besides them, 
Table 6 includes rate of return indexes of various hedge fund strategies from 1998 to the 
second quarter of 2010. The main groups of hedge fund strategies according to Hedge 
Fund Research, Inc. are printed in bold with indexes for few relevant subgroups under each 
group. The S&P 500 index will allow us to compare the hedge fund performance to the 
overall performance of equity market. 
As the next step, we compute a correlation matrix for these data, so that we can see 
what their mutual correlations are.85 
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1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 YTD Q2 2010
S&P 500 28.59% 21.03% -9.09% -11.85% -22.09% 28.67% 10.86% 4.91% 15.78% 5.49% -36.99% 26.47% -6.64%
HFRI Equity Hedge 15.98% 44.22% 9.09% 0.40% -4.71% 20.54% 7.68% 10.60% 11.71% 10.48% -26.65% 24.55% -1.71%
HFRI EH: Equity Market Neutral 8.30% 7.09% 14.56% 6.71% 0.98% 2.44% 4.15% 6.22% 7.32% 5.29% -5.93% 1.43% -0.69%
HFRI Event Driven 1.70% 24.33% 6.74% 12.18% -4.30% 25.33% 15.01% 7.29% 15.33% 6.61% -21.82% 25.04% 2.26%
HFRI ED: Merger Arbitrage 7.23% 14.34% 18.02% 2.76% -0.87% 7.47% 4.08% 6.25% 14.24% 7.05% -5.36% 11.63% 0.71%
HFRI ED: Distressed -4.23% 16.94% 2.78% 13.28% 5.28% 29.56% 18.89% 8.27% 15.94% 5.08% -25.20% 28.13% 3.92%
HFRI Relative Value 2.81% 14.73% 13.41% 8.92% 5.44% 9.72% 5.58% 6.02% 12.37% 8.94% -18.04% 25.80% 3.64%
HFRI RV: Convertible Arbitrage 7.77% 14.41% 14.50% 13.37% 9.05% 9.93% 1.18% -1.86% 12.17% 5.33% -33.71% 60.17% 2.69%
HFRI Macro 6.19% 17.62% 1.97% 6.87% 7.44% 21.42% 4.63% 6.79% 8.15% 11.11% 4.83% 4.37% -1.16%
HFRI Fund Weighted Composite 2.62% 31.29% 4.98% 4.62% -1.45% 19.55% 9.03% 9.30% 12.89% 9.96% -19.02% 19.98% -0.21%
HFRI FOF Composite -5.11% 26.47% 4.07% 2.80% 1.02% 11.61% 6.86% 7.49% 10.39% 10.25% -21.36% 11.46% -1.03%
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Table 7: Correlation matrix of the HFRI indices of annual investment returns of hedge fund strategies 
 
Source: Author’s research 
Firstly, correlations with the S&P 500 index are quite straightforward. Overall HFRI 
Fund Weighted Composite index’s correlation with S&P 500 amounts to 0.803, since the 
index comprises hedge funds across various strategies, most of which are equity based. On 
the other hand, correlation of the HFRI FoF Composite index with the S&P 500 is 0.661, 
as portfolios of FOHFs are usually more diversified. 
Moving to the strategies, a high correlation between Equity Hedge strategies and the 
S&P 500 index (0.850) was expected, since Equity Hedge strategies predominantly 
specialise in long and short positions in equity and equity derivative securities. Hence 
returns of these strategies move in accordance with moves in the equity markets. On the 
contrary, Macro strategies, which are based on movements of underlying economic 
variables and their impact on security prices, correlate with equity market represented by 
the S&P 500 much less (0.460). 
However, correlations among strategies themselves are more important for us, since 
we can derive some conclusions about systemic risk upon them. Indeed, we will analyse 
the main group of strategies only. Table 7 shows that there are relatively high levels of 
mutual correlation between Equity Hedge, Event Driven and Relative Value strategies. 
Equity Hedge strategies correlate the most; their correlation coefficients for Event Driven 
and Relative Value strategies are 0.857 and 0.774, respectively. Correlation of Event 
Driven and Relative Value strategies is also significant – it amounts to 0.854. Correlations 
of the three groups of strategies with Macro strategies are less significant, amounting to 
0.546 for Equity Hedge, 0.493 for Event Driven and 0.190 for Relative Value strategies. 
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S&P 500 1.000
HFRI Equity Hedge 0.850 1.000
HFRI EH: Equity Market Neutral 0.371 0.516 1.000
HFRI Event Driven 0.803 0.857 0.414 1.000
HFRI ED: Merger Arbitrage 0.617 0.765 0.790 0.677 1.000
HFRI ED: Distressed 0.695 0.703 0.261 0.946 0.502 1.000
HFRI Relative Value 0.644 0.774 0.525 0.854 0.762 0.829 1.000
HFRI RV: Convertible Arbitrage 0.584 0.638 0.320 0.726 0.591 0.731 0.929 1.000
HFRI Macro 0.460 0.546 0.062 0.493 0.228 0.435 0.190 0.044 1.000
HFRI Fund Weighted Composite 0.803 0.956 0.432 0.942 0.723 0.842 0.822 0.657 0.602 1.000
HFRI FOF Composite 0.661 0.889 0.471 0.883 0.697 0.812 0.813 0.594 0.555 0.963 1.000
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Box 3: Main categories of hedge fund strategies according to Hedge Fund Research, Inc. 
  
Main Categories of Hedge Fund Strategies  
Equity Hedge 
Equity Hedge strategies maintain positions both long and short in primarily equity and 
equity derivative securities. A wide variety of investment processes can be employed to 
arrive at an investment decision, including both quantitative and fundamental techniques; 
strategies can be broadly diversified or narrowly focused on specific sectors and can range 
broadly in terms of levels of net exposure, leverage employed, holding period, 
concentrations of market capitalizations and valuation ranges of typical portfolios. Equity 
Hedge managers would typically maintain at least 50% exposure to, and may in some 
cases be entirely invested in, equities – both long and short. 
Event Driven 
Investment managers maintain positions in companies currently or prospectively involved 
in corporate transactions of a wide variety including but not limited to mergers, 
restructurings, financial distress, tender offers, shareholder buybacks, debt exchanges, 
security issuance or other capital structure adjustments. Security types can range from 
most senior in the capital structure to most junior or subordinated, and frequently involve 
additional derivative securities. Event Driven exposure includes a combination of 
sensitivities to equity markets, credit markets and idiosyncratic, company specific 
developments. Investment theses are typically predicated on fundamental characteristics 
(as opposed to quantitative), with the realization of the thesis predicated on a specific 
development exogenous to the existing capital structure. 
Macro 
Investment managers use a broad range of strategies in which the investment process is 
predicated on movements in underlying economic variables and the impact these have on 
equity, fixed income, hard currency and commodity markets. Managers employ a variety 
of techniques, both discretionary and systematic analysis, combinations of top down and 
bottom up theses, quantitative and fundamental approaches and long and short term 
holding periods. Although some strategies employ RV techniques, Macro strategies are 
distinct from RV strategies in that the primary investment thesis is predicated on predicted 
or future movements in the underlying instruments, rather than realization of a valuation 
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But what do correlations of strategies say about systemic risk? Basically, imagine a 
situation in the market which adversely affects one of the strategies. In case of high 
correlations, the indexes move hand in hand (up to certain extent). Hence if one strategy 
suffers from the market development, other strategies with which the particular one is 
strongly correlated are likely to suffer, too, according to statistics, which endangers the 
whole industry. Probability of overall industry getting in serious trouble is thus increased 
when an adverse development in the financial market takes place, just like we have seen 
recently. Therefore, with high correlation of strategies there is much higher probability of 
significantly increased price volatility during bad times, since very many funds will try 
hard to deleverage. Moreover, in case of failure of several important hedge funds, a chain 
of failures of systemically important institutions might be triggered. Hence not only market 
channel but also credit channel of systemic risk applies with high correlation of hedge fund 
strategies. Disregarding our previous discussion about extensive regulation of hedge funds 
discrepancy between securities. In a similar way, while both Macro and equity hedge 
managers may hold equity securities, the overriding investment thesis is predicated on the 
impact movements in underlying macroeconomic variables may have on security prices, as 
opposed to EH, in which the fundamental characteristics of the company are the most 
significant and integral to investment thesis. 
Relative Value 
Investment managers maintain positions in which the investment thesis is predicated on 
realization of a valuation discrepancy in the relationship between multiple securities. 
Managers employ a variety of fundamental and quantitative techniques to establish 
investment theses, and security types range broadly across equity, fixed income, derivative 
or other security types. Fixed income strategies are typically quantitatively driven to 
measure the existing relationship between instruments and, in some cases, identify 
attractive positions in which the risk adjusted spread between these instruments represents 
an attractive opportunity for the investment manager. RV position may be involved in 
corporate transactions also, but as opposed to ED exposures, the investment thesis is 
predicated on realization of a pricing discrepancy between related securities, as opposed to 
the outcome of the corporate transaction. 
Source: Hedge Fund Research, Inc. 
See https://hedgefundresearch.com/index.php?fuse=indices-new&1291562720 for all strategy definitions. 
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Since we now have completed the assessment of all the hypotheses of this thesis, we 
provide a summary of our results in Table 8. 
Table 8: Summary of hypotheses 
Hypothesis Rejected Not Rejected 
1. Non-bank sector of financial markets carries a considerable portion of systemic risk. ●  
2. AIFM Directive will bring more costs than benefits.  ● 
3. Rates of return of various hedge fund strategies are strongly 
correlated.  ● 
  
65 
 
Table 9: Summary of the proposed or adopted modifications of the hedge fund regulatory framework 
Author/Measure Year Description Advantages Drawbacks 
Security and 
Exchange 
Commission 
Hedge Fund Rule 
2004 The Rule forced hedge 
fund managers to count 
each of their investors 
rather than the fund itself 
as their clients. Under such 
circumstances, managers 
would not have qualified 
for the exemption from the 
Advisers Act, since they 
provided services to more 
than fourteen clients, and 
they had to register with 
the SEC. 
In 2006, the Rule was 
vacated and remanded by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the DC Circuit. 
Once registered, 
hedge fund managers 
would have had to 
submit examinations, 
maintain certain books 
and standards and 
adopt codes of ethics. 
SEC would have had 
some oversight 
concerning hedge 
fund activity. Thus 
possibilities to reveal 
financial difficulties 
as well as fraud at an 
earlier stage would 
have been enhanced. 
Registration would 
have increased burden 
of both the industry 
and the SEC. Further, 
the typical fraud 
involves small hedge 
funds which would 
not have been subject 
to registration under 
the Rule anyway. 
Moreover, the Rule 
could have been 
evaded by simply 
lengthening the lock-
up period to two 
years.   
Security and 
Exchange 
Commission 
New Antifraud Rule 
2007 The Rule was designed to 
protect investors in the 
U.S. pooled investment 
vehicles against fraud. It 
applies to managers of 
hedge funds as well as 
private equity funds and 
mutual funds, whether 
registered under the 
Advisers Act or not. 
False or misleading 
statements or other 
attempts at defrauding 
investors of the 
pooled investment 
vehicles by their 
managers are legally 
considered a 
fraudulent and 
deceptive act which is 
subject to appropriate 
provisions. 
No benefit from the 
financial stability 
point of view has been 
achieved by the Rule, 
since its objective was 
to enhance investor 
protection rather than 
to prevent industry 
difficulties capable of 
adversely affecting the 
broader financial 
sector from occurring. 
European 
Commission 
De Larosière Report 
2009 The Group suggests 
extending regulation to all 
entities with potential 
systemic impact. Hedge 
funds all over the EU 
should be approached in 
the similar way they are 
treated in the UK. They 
suggest the adoption of 
capital controls and 
reporting obligations for 
hedge funds, their 
registration and control of 
strategies and leverage. 
The UK model of 
hedge fund regulation 
appears to be a 
convenient form of 
the alternative 
investment vehicles 
treatment that neither 
suppresses the 
industry’s 
performance nor 
imposes prohibitive 
costs on either of the 
involved institutions. 
Hence its spread over 
Europe is an 
interesting idea. 
By an adoption of all 
or some of the 
measures extending 
beyond the current 
UK model, 
administrative and 
compliance costs 
would increase not 
only for the affected 
funds but also for 
regulatory authorities, 
pushing down 
significantly the 
industry’s 
productivity. Above 
all, the intended 
positive impact on the 
stability of the 
financial system is 
highly uncertain (or 
even improbable) 
anyway. 
  
66 
 
Financial Services 
Authority 
Turner Review 
2009 The report suggests 
regulatory authorities 
should concentrate on 
gathering extensive 
information on hedge 
funds activity and on being 
flexible to apply prudential 
regulation if hedge funds 
become bank-like in nature 
or systemically important. 
Imposing only light 
regulatory 
requirements in the 
form of reporting 
obligations would 
contribute to enhanced 
transparency of the 
industry without 
increasing the costs of 
compliance too much. 
Without specifying 
parameters, according 
to which a hedge fund 
could be considered a 
“bank-like” or a 
systemically 
important institution, 
the decision remains 
on a discretion of the 
corresponding 
regulator. Hence a risk 
of excessive and 
inappropriate 
regulation still exists. 
European 
Commission 
AIFM Directive 
2009 The Directive imposes 
registration and disclosure 
requirements upon hedge 
fund managers, sets 
authorization requirements 
necessary for granting the 
“EU passport”, deals with 
third country marketing 
and other issues, such as 
limits on leverage. 
Transparency and 
disclosure of 
investments would be 
increased by applying 
the Directive. 
Moreover, since a 
fund manager would 
be allowed to trade his 
fund throughout the 
EU once he has been 
granted the “EU 
passport”, the Single 
Market would be 
enhanced. 
The Directive’s 
protectionist nature 
might make the non-
EU managers stop 
marketing their funds 
in the EU which 
would result in a 
decrease of 
investment choice, 
leaving the whole EU 
less competitive. 
Further, the Directive 
features a “one-size-
fits-all” approach. 
Party of European 
Socialists 
P. N. Rasmussen’s 
opinion 
2010 Strong enemy of hedge 
funds and private equity 
funds and a keen supporter 
of the AIFM Directive. He 
suggests even stricter 
measures to regulate the 
funds to be applied, such 
as strict limits on leverage, 
penalties for improper 
conduct, non-EU funds to 
be covered by the EU 
regulation, etc. 
Strict regulatory rules 
for the AIFs would 
result in lower 
volatility of financial 
markets and higher 
transparency of OTC 
markets. 
The costs of 
compliance would 
become prohibitive 
for many fund 
managers who would 
therefore cease to 
operate in the EU. 
Non-EU funds would 
be discouraged from 
investing in the EU 
due to strict regulation 
they would be subject 
to. 
U.S. Government 
Dodd-Frank Act w/ 
the Volcker Rule 
2010 The U.S. regulatory 
response to the financial 
crisis focuses mainly on 
the banking sector but 
devotes attention also to 
non-banks. It imposes an 
obligation to register on 
hedge funds with more 
than $150 million of assets 
and puts them subject to 
the SEC inspections. The 
Volcker Rule prohibits 
banks from proprietary 
trading and limits their 
hedge fund investments 
and activity. 
Registration of large 
hedge funds brings 
more transparency and 
increases the 
probability of fraud 
detection. The funds 
are not burdened by 
any prudential rules or 
conduct-of-business 
rules. From the hedge 
fund manager point of 
view, a significant 
advantage of the Act 
is the prohibition of 
banks’ hedge fund 
activity, since a large 
competitor in the 
market is thus 
weakened. 
Despite imposing only 
disclosure 
requirements on hedge 
funds, the Act leaves a 
broad opportunity for 
the SEC to expand its 
regulatory powers 
over the industry in 
the future upon its 
own discretion. Many 
details are left for the 
regulators to decide 
later, hence future 
additional regulatory 
burden is not out of 
the question. 
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3.1.4. The Stories of Hedge Fund Failure 
In the world of hedge funds, failures are nothing unusual. Sure enough, only to the 
extent the failing institutions are minor players in the financial markets. However, if they 
are a big multibillion hedge funds, their failure can be much more spectacular. In the 
history of hedge fund industry there were two remarkable cases of such a hedge fund 
failure that have been widely discussed ever since. Although they both involved huge 
losses in billions of USD, their impact on global markets was different. The first one 
demonstrated the fragility of the funds and imposed a big threat on the global financial 
markets. On the other hand, the second failure, though even more severe, did not affect the 
markets significantly. They are the cases of the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) 
hedge fund of 1998 and the Amaranth Advisors hedge fund of 2006. The stories are 
described in Box 4 and Box 5. If the reader is familiar with them, he may skip them and 
continue directly to the text that follows afterwards. 
Box 4: The 1998 case of Long-Term Capital Management 
d86 
h87 
  
                                                           
86
 A typical convergence trading strategy is to bet that the price difference between two assets with similar, 
but not identical, characteristics will narrow in the future. See Xiong (2001) for a comprehensive study of 
convergence trading with wealth effects. 
87
 Dynamic hedging is a hedging technique which seeks to limit the investment's exposure to delta and 
gamma by adjusting the hedge as the underlying security changes. For further studies of dynamic hedging, 
see e.g. Coleman, Kim, Li & Verma (1999). 
The 1998 Case of Long-Term Capital Management 
The LTCM fund was founded in 1994. Before the problems came, it had been no 
loosely-performing institution. The minimum investment was set to $10 million with 3-
year lock-in period. Management and incentive fees charged by the fund managers were 
rather high relatively to other institutions, amounting to 2% and 25%, respectively. The 
initially raised equity prior to the start of business amounted to $1.25 billion. Profitability 
of the fund was huge, till 1997 the amount of equity increased to $7 billion. In 1995, net 
returns reached 40%, in 1997 they were something less than 20%. See Figure 10 for an 
illustration of the return development of the fund. 
Such high profits were achieved thanks to investment strategies employed, among 
which there were convergence trading86 and dynamic hedging87. However, in order to 
exploit reasonable profits out of these strategies the fund had to take large positions that 
were highly leveraged (Prabhu, 2001). In the half of 1998, the fund’s balance sheet 
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The failure of LTCM resulted in broad discussions about policy framework and 
regulatory issues concerning alternative investment vehicles. In an effort to prevent 
another collapse in the future, banks increased margin requirements when lending to hedge 
comprised assets that were worth $125 billion. Since at the end of 1997 the fund had 
returned to its investors approx. 36% of capital base, the corresponding half-1998 level of 
equity was $4.1 billion. The leverage ratio thus accounted for 30-to-1, which was unusual 
and highly risky even for a hedge fund. Moreover, the fund was exposed to a substantial 
repudiation risk due to holding large amounts of Russian governmental bonds which was 
not a safe investment at the time, since Russia’s economy was heading for a severe crisis. 
Soon, the problems actually materialized with the devaluation of Russian currency 
and the default of the Russian government on its debt in August 1998. LTCM’s holding of 
Russian government bonds together with consequences in financial markets driving the 
yield spreads in the other direction than the fund had been betting on implied heavy losses 
for the fund. It had to start selling its assets in order to meet margin calls of banks, whose 
collaterals for LTCM’s debts shrank as a consequence of the Russian default (Riemlová, 
2008). Demands for capital injections were unsuccessful; the fund ended up with a loss of 
approx. $3.5 billion of its capital base over August and September and its potential near 
collapse was feared by many. Consequences for the already fragile markets would have 
been rather dangerous, regarding the large position the LTCM’s portfolio comprised. 
LTCM’s trading counterparties and creditors were exposed to high risk due to the 
uncertain future of the fund. In case it really collapsed, they would have been seriously 
harmed. Hence, in search for the least costly solution, the four most concerned of them, 
known as the Core Group, started to consider recapitalization of the LTCM by mutual 
investments of its major counterparties (later referred to as the consortium approach). 
Eventually, fourteen companies participated in the consortium. Under the deal arranged by 
the Fed, the consortium obtained 90% stake in the fund’s portfolio and the operational 
control, in exchange for $3.6 billion of investment in new equity to the fund. 
Although substantial losses were suffered by many investors in the LTCM and by its 
managers, the consortium acquisition provided enough liquidity for global financial 
markets to calm down. However, the LTCM fund itself was finally liquidated in 2000. 
Source of data and information: 
Riemlová (2008), U.S. President Working Group on Financial Markets (1999) 
69 
 
funds as well as increased the disclosure requirements on information on hedge fund 
activities (Riemlová, 2008). 
Figure 10: Value of $1 invested in the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund vs. S&P 500 
(March 1994-October 1998) 
 
Source: Prabhu (2001) 
However, although he admits LTCM was a spectacular case, Shadab (2007) claims 
there is little to learn from its failure about hedge fund regulation nowadays, since the 
fund’s loss was caused by its unique characteristics with combination of the Asian crisis of 
1997 and Russian devaluation and default of 1998. Shadab argues that additional 
regulation should not be imposed on hedge funds, since today’s funds are much less 
leveraged than the LTCM back in 1998 and they constitute systemic risk no greater than 
conventional financial institutions. As an example of the ability of today’s advanced 
markets to survive major failures he puts forth the case of Amaranth Advisors hedge fund, 
which is the second story we are going to present. 
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Box 5: The 2006 case of Amaranth Advisors 
 
There are several factors of why the reaction of markets was so dramatically 
different from the case of LTCM. Amaranth’s leverage prior to the fall was approximately 
8:1, hence significantly lower than the one of LTCM (Broughton, 2006). Riemlová (2008) 
further explains that, firstly, Amaranth was only active in a small-scale natural gas market, 
hence besides the fund managers its losses were borne by relatively small number of 
creditors. Secondly, banks took their lesson from the LTCM story and held more equity 
and collateral against hedge fund risk. And thirdly, broader and more liquid global 
financial markets in 2006 were able to better cope with the failure of a large hedge fund. 
As we have already mentioned, Shadab (2007) presents the case of Amaranth 
Advisors as a proof that additional regulation of hedge funds is unnecessary since markets 
nowadays are able to handle even failure of such a large institution. However, it is crucial 
to remember the circumstances under which LTCM failed. Asian Crisis of 1997 preceded 
the failure which brought great deal of uncertainty to the markets. The Russian default and 
devaluation in 1998 were subsequently the final impulse that destabilised financial markets 
largely. In order to prevent further destabilisation, strong efforts to rescue the LTCM fund 
The 2006 Case of Amaranth Advisors 
Amaranth Advisors hedge fund was another large institution that got into serious 
troubles. It was founded in 2000 and focused mainly on spread trading in natural gas 
market. Till 2006 it had been very successful in doing so and the fund had been very 
profitable. 
However, in September 2006, the bet on future price of natural gas turned out to be 
completely wrong. During a single week, the fund lost approx. $6 billion which was much 
more than the LTCM lost over several months. Despite the fact, that it was the largest 
hedge fund failure by that time, markets and counterparties hardly noticed any troubles.  
No bailout plans were designed. Instead, Amaranth’s assets were sold for $2 billion 
to JP Morgan investment bank and to the Citadel hedge fund. As a result, the fund’s 
investors recovered one third of their investments into the fund, while its counterparties’ 
claims were entirely satisfied. 
Source of data and information: 
Broughton (2006), Riemlová (2008), Shadab (2007) 
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were put forth. On the contrary, failure of Amaranth arose due to a bad decision in trading 
at times of global economic boom. Markets were stabilised and thus able to incorporate the 
consequences of the failure. Incentives to bail the fund out were thus far smaller. 
Thus, we believe it is not possible to objectively derive conclusions whether 
additional regulation is necessary or not on the basis of the two cases of failure, since the 
conditions under which both failures took place were significantly different. However, it is 
clear that both funds and markets have taken their lessons and are much more likely to 
survive a major failure of a large hedge fund even at times of strong economic turmoil, 
which is after all the case of the latest crisis. 
As has already been mentioned at the beginning of this subchapter, besides the above 
mentioned spectacular hedge fund failures there have been also many other collapses, 
some of them smaller, some bigger. For this reason, Table 10 provides a summary of 
selected hedge fund failures with large losses over the last sixteen years and also lists the 
strategies, brief causes and estimated losses of each case. 
Table 10: Selected hedge fund failures and large losses 
Fund Strategy Year 
Estimated 
Loss 
What went wrong? 
Amaranth Multistrategy 2006 6,400 Excessive exposure to energy prices 
Long-Term Capital Management Fixed-income arbitrage 1998 3,600 Excess leverage during Russian default crisis 
Tiger Management Macro 2000 2,600 Bad bet on yen lost USD 2 billion 
Soros Fund Macro 2000 2,000 Major losses on Internet and technology stocks 
Fenchurch Capital Fixed-income arbitrage 1995 1,264 Failed shift from US-only to European markets 
Princeton Economics International Macro 1999 950 Market losses, fraud 
Vairocana Ltd. Fixed-income arbitrage 1994 700 Market losses, bet on falling rates 
Lipper Convertible arbitrage 2001 700 Market losses, fraud 
Askin Capital Management Fixed-income arbitrage 1994 660 Failed hedge, market losses, margin calls 
Lancer Long/short equity 2003 600 Fraud 
Beacon Fixed income arbitrage 2002 500 
Losses on mortgage derivatives, failed to mark to 
market 
Manhattan Investment Fund Long/short equity 1999 400 Fraud 
MotherRock Energy Fund 2006 230 Loss from natural gas market 
Global Systems Fund Macro 1997 125 Wiped out by collapse of Thai baht 
Argonaut Capital Management Macro 1994 110 Market losses 
Maricopa Investment Long/short equity 2000 59 Market losses, fraud 
Cambridge Partners Long/short equity 2000 45 Fraud 
HL Gestion/Volter Managed futures 2000 40 Market losses, regulatory intervention 
Ashbury Capital Partners Long/short equity 2001 40 Fraud 
ETJ Partners Relative value 2001 21 Market losses, fraud 
Ballybunion Capital Long/short equity 2000 7 Fraud 
Source: Ferguson & Laster (2007) 
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3.2. Private Equity 
Private equity is a term encompassing several industries – buyouts, venture capital, 
expansion capital, etc. Although there are important distinctions between these terms, they 
tend to be generally referred to as private equity (O’Brien, 2010).88 To make it clear, we 
provide a list of private equity activity as it was summarized by TheCityUK (2010b): 
Investments represent the financing of businesses through venture capital, 
buyouts and other forms of financing. Venture capital represents investment in 
companies that have undeveloped or developing products (seed stage, start-up 
stage, expansion stage, replacement capital). Buyout funds typically target the 
acquisition of a significant portion or majority control of businesses which 
normally entails a change of ownership. These are generally investments in 
more mature companies. Special situation includes a range of investments such 
as distressed debt, equity-linked debt, project finance and leasing. This 
category includes investment in subordinated debt, referred to as mezzanine 
debt financing. 
Fund raising refers to the money investors have committed to private 
equity funds in any one year. 
Divestments represent the realisation or exiting of a private equity 
investment. This is generally done by selling the company either to another 
private equity firm or to another corporation or floating the company on a stock 
market. Divestment is the moment when a private equity firm actually earns 
profit.89 
Buyout is a slightly more often used form of private equity investment. As can be 
seen in Figure 11, buyouts accounted for 66% of total funds raised in 2008, while in 2009 
they accounted for 57%. The smaller category – venture capital – is further divided into 
four subcategories. (1) seed stage represents financing of research and development of 
an initial concept, (2) start-up stage focuses on facilitating product development and 
marketing, (3) expansion stage finances growth of a company which is already trading at a 
                                                           
88
 There is a difference in terminology between Europe and the U.S. – while in Europe there are three main 
categories of private equity businesses, namely buyouts, venture capital and expansion capital (later stage 
of company’s existence), in the U.S. terminology, venture capital and expansion capital tend to be referred 
to jointly. See e.g. European Commission (2006). 
89
 Taken from TheCityUK (2010b), pp. 4 
 profit, and (4) replacemen
company from another private equity investor or from other shareholders.
Figure 11: Private equity funds raised by expected form of investment
Source: TheCityUK 
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Actually, private equity funds bear many similarities with hedge funds. Let us review 
them at first: 
• accredited investors 
The private equity funds investors are either institutional or they are the high 
net worth individuals.90 To qualify for an investment in the fund, they must 
be accredited at first, i.e. they must be willing to invest certain minimum 
amount of money. Minimum requirements for investments vary considerably 
across funds. Like hedge funds, private equity funds do not attract investors 
publicly by advertising but rather directly or through a broker. 
• managerial and performance fees 
Managers in a private equity firm who run a fund typically charge a 
management fee and a performance fee. The former one, being the only 
source of fixed income, has traditionally been computed as a fixed annual rate 
from the committed capital, e.g. 2% a year91 over the life of the fund, say 10 
years, hence accounting for 20% of the committed capital altogether, leaving 
80% of the committed capital free for investments. Recently, however, a 
trend of a decreasing management fee has prevailed. In such a case, managers 
charge certain fee over the investment period, which is then decreased by 
a certain amount of basis points a year after the investment period has ended 
(Metrick & Yasuda, 2010).92 The performance fee is a source of variable 
income and it is computed as a percentage of the profits of the fund. 
• lack of regulation 
Similarly to hedge funds, private equity funds usually operate exempt from 
the obligation of registration with the regulatory authorities, hence without 
any or with only a light touch of regulatory requirements. 
  
                                                           
90
 According to the European Commission (2006), up to 85% of European private equity funds investors 
were institutional ones (banks, pension funds, etc.). 
91
 Similarly to hedge funds, there is a downward trend in the remuneration structure. 
92
 There can also be other structures for the computation of the management fee. An interested reader 
might consider reading Metrick & Yasuda (2010). 
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• leverage 
In case of buyouts, private equity funds use leverage as well as private funds 
for investing in selected companies. Actually, there is a category of the 
private equity business which is called leveraged buyouts which uses heavy 
leverage for acquiring portfolio companies, so that the committed capital is 
diversified among many investments. Usually, the assets of an acquired 
company serve as collateral to the loan. Moreover, also the portfolio 
companies of a private equity fund use leverage, although much lower than 
the large financial institutions.93 
There are however significant differences that distinguish private equity funds from 
hedge funds. Let us review them briefly: 
• invested capital vs. committed capital 
Unlike in case of hedge funds or mutual funds, the level of assets under 
management of private equity funds is not well-defined, since private equity 
firms receive only commitments from investors to provide funds when 
needed for investments of the private equity fund (Metrick & Yasuda, 2010). 
The total amount of such commitments is referred to as the committed 
capital. Hence private equity funds do not maintain a pool of uninvested 
capital but they rather perform a capital call to investors when the private 
equity firm – the general partner – decides to invest in a selected company. 
• infrequent redemptions vs. virtually no redemptions 
Investment in the fund is of a long-term nature with very few possibilities, if 
any, to withdraw money from the fund before the end of the ex-ante 
contracted investment term. However, over the life of a fund there can be a 
cash distribution among investors in case the fund sells its investment in a 
portfolio company, or the fund can distribute company shares instead. 
  
                                                           
93
 See “Private Equity and Systemic Risk”, available at www.privateequitycouncil.org/just-the-facts/private-
equity-and-systemic-risk/  
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• variety of investment strategies vs. long-term investment in a portfolio 
company 
While the main objective of a hedge fund is to create short-term profit and for 
this purpose it uses many different strategies combining short and long 
positions, private equity funds invest long-term, working to improve the 
company’s performance, cut costs, sell assets and motivate the management 
of the company (O’Brien, 2010). 
3.2.1. Private Equity Market94 
Over recent years, the interest in the private equity market has grown rapidly because 
of the fact that private equity investments have experienced constantly higher returns than 
other more conventional forms of investment. The growth of private equity market over 
recent years has taken place largely thanks to private equity funds which act as 
intermediaries in the market. On one side there are investors, on the other issuers of 
securities. According to TheCityUK (2010b), almost four-fifths of private equity 
investments flow through intermediaries, the rest being invested directly in the issuers. 
Most of the overall private equity capital comes from institutional investors. 
TheCityUK (2010b) further states that, since private equity is a very expensive form of 
financing, the issuers are mostly firms that do not have access to any alternative source of 
acquiring necessary funds. The structure of a private equity market looks as illustrated in 
Figure 12. 
Figure 12: Private equity market 
 
Source: TheCityUK (2010b) 
                                                           
94
 Data based on IFSL (2010), TheCityUK (2010b) and TheCityUK databases. 
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The British Private Equity & Venture Capital Association has pointed out that the 
private equity industry is a significant contributor to the UK economy (TheCityUK, 2010b) 
for the following reasons: 
• Companies that have received private equity backing in the UK account for 
employment of around 3 million people, or 16% of UK private sector 
employees. In addition private equity funds based in the UK employ several 
thousand people. 
• Through investment overseas, the industry contributes to the current account 
of the UK balance of payments through income and capital gains. Exports of 
private equity backed companies grew by 10% annually over the five years to 
2006/07 totalling a cumulative £188bn in export sales during this period. 
• Sales revenue of private equity backed companies rose by 8% a year between 
2001/02 and 2006/07 totalling £1,331bn during this period. Private equity 
backed companies contributed £35bn in taxes in 2006/07. 
• Higher rate of return provides an attractive asset for institutional investors, 
lifting prospective income of their clients.95 
For illustration, numbers of persons directly employed in the private equity industry 
in the UK as well is in the whole EU are presented in Table 11 on the data from 2008. 
Moreover, tax inflow generated from private equity industry is also significant, as is shown 
in Table 11 as well. 
Table 11: Contribution of the private equity industry to the economy – amount of tax revenues generated and 
people directly employed in 2008 
  Tax (€ million) People employed 
UK 2,433 8,147 
EU 4,989 27,272 
Source: OpenEurope (2009) 
At the end of 2009, assets under management of private equity firms worldwide 
totalled over $2.5 trillion, a value only slightly higher than in 2008. Of the total, funds 
available for investment accounted for approx. $1 trillion, i.e. 40%. As can be seen in 
Figure 13, the growth of assets under management over recent years has been mostly due 
                                                           
95
 Taken from TheCityUK (2010b), pp. 7 
 to the growth of the unrealised portfolio value because of lower investment activity 
associated with falls in equity markets 
Figure 13: Private equity assets under management worldwide
Source: TheCityUK 
3.2.2. Key Players
 At the end of 2009, the world’s largest private equity firm was Goldman Sachs 
Principal Investment Area with amount of capital raised 
comparable to the amount of assets under management of the largest hedge fund. It was 
followed by The Carlyle Group with $47.8
$47 billion. Similarly as in case of the hedge fund industry, New York and London are the 
key locations for private equity firms. Of the 
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Table 12: Largest private equity firms by amount of capital raised for direct private equity investment in 
5 years up to end-2009 
Private Equity Firm $ billion 
  1. Goldman Sachs Principal Inv. Area 54.6 
  2. The Carlyle Group 47.8 
  3. Kohlberg Kravis Roberts 47.0 
  4. TPG 45.1 
  5. Apollo Global Management 34.7 
  6. Bain Capital 34.2 
  7. CVC Capital Partners 31.1 
  8. The Blackstone Group 29.2 
  9. Bain Capital 23.0 
 10. Warburg Pincus 21.7 
Source: TheCityUK 
3.2.3. Key Transactions 
The three biggest transactions in the private equity market during 2009 and the first 
half of 2010 were the $3.9 billion acquisition of Talecris Biotherapeutics by Grifols SA, 
the $3.1 billion acquisition of Bridas Corp. by CNOOC Ltd. and the $3.0 billion 
acquisition of Interactive Data Corp. by Interactive Data SPV. See Table 13 for a more 
comprehensive list of private equity deals. 
Table 13: Largest private equity transactions during 2009 and the first half of 2010 
Transaction Private Equity Firm (Acquirer) $ billion 
  1. Talecris Biotherapeutics Grifols SA 3.9 
  2. Bridas Corp. CNOOC Ltd. 3.1 
  3. Interactive Data Corp. Interactive Data SPV 3.0 
  4. Healthscope Ltd. Healthscope Ltd. SPV 2.1 
  5. Michael Foods Inc. GS Capital Partners 1.7 
  6. Styron Corp Bain Capital Partners 1.6 
  7. Pets At Home Ltd KKR & Co 1.5 
  8. DynCorp International Cerberus Capital 1.4 
Source: Reuters 
Although they were the largest over recent 20 months, these transactions were still 
relatively small. It becomes obvious immediately when compared to the list of largest 
transactions generally (Table 14). The differences from the pre-crisis amounts are striking. 
The sum of the eight largest private equity investments of 2009 and the first half of 2010 is 
only slightly higher than the single seventh largest private equity transaction generally. 
According to TheCityUK (2010b), the sharp decline has taken place due to buyout 
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managers shifting funds to distressed debt, bankruptcy financing, private investments in 
public equity, emerging markets and financial institutions. 
Table 14: Largest private equity transactions generally 
Transaction Private Equity Firm (Acquirer) $ billion 
  1. Equity Office Properties Trust (2007) Blackstone 38.9 
  2. Hospital Corp. of America (2006) Bain, KKR, Merrill Lynch 32.7 
  3. RJR Nabisco (1989) KKR 31.1 
  4. Harrah's Entertainment (2006) Apollo, Texas Pacific 27.4 
  5. Clear Channel Communications (2006) Bain, Thomas H. Lee 25.7 
  6. Kinder Morgan (2006) Carlyle, Riverstone, Goldman Sachs 21.6 
  7. Freescale Semiconductor (2006) Blackstone, Carlyle, Permira, Texas Pacific 17.6 
  8. Albertson's (2006) Cerberus 17.4 
Source: Fortune 
Interestingly, as can be seen in Table 14, 2006 was really a good year for the private 
equity industry, as six of the eight largest private equity transactions of all times took place 
in this year. This fact is supported also by Figure 17, where we can see that the years 2006-
2008 were by far the most successful over recent decade as for both funds raised as well as 
funds invested. On the other hand, the year 2009 experienced a steep decline in both 
values. 
3.2.4. Private Equity Regulation 
Similarly to hedge funds, private equity funds have traditionally been exempt from 
financial regulation imposed on traditional investment vehicles. What distinguishes them 
from hedge funds, however, is that there seems to be a wider agreement on the fact that 
private equity funds do not represent a significant threat to the financial system. Private 
equity managers deal almost exclusively with sophisticated investors who are able to 
assess and understand all the risk stemming from the investment. According to EVCA, this 
fact is very much reflected in the type and level of regulation of private equity funds.96 
There are further arguments refusing the idea about private equity funds being 
systemically risky which are mostly of the following nature97: 
                                                           
96
 www.evca.eu/publicandregulatoryaffairs/default.aspx?id=86 
97
 The list of arguments taken from “Private Equity and Systemic Risk”, available at 
http://www.privateequitycouncil.org/just-the-facts/private-equity-and-systemic-risk/ 
81 
 
• private equity relies on long-term capital and invests mostly in illiquid assets, 
hence the funds are not subject to runs, as was the case of many other 
investment vehicles 
• they do not have to sell assets in times of diminishing prices in order to fund 
investors’ redemptions, since there are usually no redemption periods 
• low, if any, leverage in comparison to other (alternative) investment vehicles 
• portfolio companies are not deeply inter-connected with other players in the 
financial markets, hence they are not likely to trigger a series of losses 
leading to systemic risk 
• private equity funds’ portfolios are diversified across multiple industries, 
hence they are not exposed to any single sector performance risk 
The opinion of private equity funds not being systemically risky is supported also by 
the European Commission (2009) stating that “private equity funds, due to their investment 
strategies and a different use of leverage than hedge funds, did not contribute to the 
increased macro-prudential risk”.98 Further, neither the De Larosière Report nor the 
Turner Review deal with private equity funds at all, on the contrary to hedge funds. This 
suggests a wide agreement among experts on private equity funds being not of a systemic 
importance. 
Indeed, considering the EU, until recently there was no harmonised regulatory 
framework for private equity at the EU level. Instead, the industry was regulated on a 
national basis in most EU member states. Notwithstanding, according to EVCA, the 
private equity industry was indirectly affected by other EU legislature, such as the Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive, UCITS, the Pension Funds Directive, and the Capital 
Requirements Directive in a way of placing regulatory requirements on the institutional 
investors investing in private equity funds.99 
Nevertheless, the main documents representing the post-crisis regulatory response of 
both EU and the U.S. actually do deal with private equity, mostly because the alternative 
investment sector of the financial market, which along private equity covers also hedge 
funds, etc., is usually looked at en block by the regulatory authorities. So, the AIFM 
Directive, which has already been discussed in Chapter 2.4.2.2, reshapes regulatory 
framework of the European AIFs, including private equity funds. And it is widely 
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criticized for this “one-size-fits-all” approach, since, besides not distinguishing between 
various types of AIFs, it does not even distinguish between systemically important funds 
and those with no systemic potential. Hence, private equity funds are subject to the same 
requirements as hedge funds although they are much less controversial from the systemic 
point of view. Further, although the industry welcomes the fact that some kind of legal 
certainty has been achieved, it is concerned that some provisions of the Directive might 
cause an unintended harm to small businesses in the form of adversely affecting financing 
of SMEs (EVCA, 2010). Aside from that, outcomes of the discussion of the AIFM 
Directive provisions from Chapter 2.4.2.2 apply also for private equity funds (see Table 
15). 
As we have already mentioned several times, the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act in 
the U.S. will have broad consequences for both hedge funds and private equity funds. In 
Chapter 3.1.3.2.B, we have discussed its implications for hedge funds. For private equity 
funds they are very similar. According to the Act, all private equity funds with more than 
$150 million of assets are subject to registration as well as periodic inspections by the 
SEC. If the SEC finds the fund too risky, it can place it under the Fed supervision 
(Deutsche Bank Research, 2010). Venture capital funds are exempted from the obligations 
imposed by the Act which generally is a welcomed fact, since companies benefiting from 
the activity of venture capital funds will not be adversely affected. The Volcker Rule, 
which is incorporated in the Act, limits banks in their investments in private equity funds. 
Generally, the Act places heavy focus on banking institutions while imposing only 
moderate provisions upon alternative investment vehicles. Hence it creates a competitive 
advantage for institutions such as private equity funds in a way that they are likely to 
benefit from banks being forbidden to engage in certain activities, e.g. proprietary 
trading.100 
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Table 15: Summary of the proposed or adopted modifications of the private equity regulatory framework 
Author/Measure Year Description Advantages Drawbacks 
European 
Commission 
De Larosière Report 
2009 De Larosière Report does 
not deal with private 
equity funds except for a 
minor note in Paragraph 92 
stating that banks should 
not be prohibited from 
owning a private equity 
fund, but rather they 
should be monitored 
closely. 
N/A N/A 
Financial Services 
Authority 
Turner Review 
2009 Although dealing with 
hedge funds in many 
contexts, the Turner 
Review does not mention 
private equity funds at all. 
N/A N/A 
European 
Commission 
AIFM Directive 
2010 The Directive imposes 
registration, disclosure and 
transparency requirements 
on AIFs including private 
equity funds and sets 
conditions for the EU 
authorization of their 
managers. 
Thanks to 
requirements imposed 
by the Directive, 
transparency of the 
industry will be 
increased. Further, the 
Single Market will be 
enhanced by allowing 
the authorized fund 
manager to market his 
fund throughout the 
EU. 
Due to its third-
country policy, non-
EU funds’ access to 
the EU market will be 
difficult which will 
result in a decline in 
the investor choice 
and in the overall 
competitiveness of the 
EU. Further, the 
Directive’s “one-size-
fits-all” approach will 
have adverse affects 
on the private equity 
industry. 
U.S. Government 
Dodd-Frank Act w/ 
the Volcker Rule 
2010 Similarly as for hedge 
funds, the Act imposes 
obligation to register on 
private equity funds with 
more than $150 million in 
assets and prescribes 
obligatory SEC inspections 
(venture capital funds 
remain exempted). The 
Volcker Rule prohibits 
banks from proprietary 
trading and limits their 
private equity activity. 
More transparency is 
brought to the 
industry by registering 
large private equity 
funds, while no 
excessive burden is 
imposed on the 
industry. Limits 
placed on the private 
equity activity of 
banks create 
competitive advantage 
for private equity 
funds. 
Despite private equity 
funds being far less 
debatable than hedge 
funds with respect to 
systemic risk, the SEC 
treats them equally 
and is empowered to 
extend its regulatory 
authority over them 
upon its own 
discretion. 
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3.3. The Subprime Crisis Performance – Hedge Funds and Private 
Equity 
3.3.1. Hedge Fund Performance 
At the beginning, there was a hedge fund – one might be tempted to conclude, 
regarding the breakout of the latest subprime crisis. However, this statement would 
account for a confusion of cause and effect. After the housing bubble in the U.S. burst and 
the real estate prices began to decline gradually101, subprime lending based on the 
assumption of stable or rising housing prices, which allowed lenders to get their money 
back by the means of foreclosure even if borrowers were unable to repay their debts, was 
hit severely. Suddenly, many borrowers defaulted on their debts, since their houses were 
hard to sell. Meanwhile however, their mortgages were transformed into various mortgage-
backed securities and traded across the financial sector. Bad loans caused these securities 
to decline in their value which was, indeed, the actual beginning of the crisis. 
In turn, many financial institutions got in trouble due to the decreasing value of 
mortgage-backed securities in their portfolios.102 Among such institutions, hedge funds 
were of no exception. Two of them, run by one of the major American investment banks, 
Bear Stearns, named the Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Fund and the Bear 
Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Enhanced Leveraged Fund lost so much of the 
value of their portfolios that they had to receive a huge bail-out from Bear Stearns in mid-
2007 to meet the obligations towards their investors. Nevertheless, within few weeks the 
funds declared bankruptcy after they had lost virtually all of the investors’ capital.103 As a 
consequence of the bankruptcy, Bear Stearns declared a 61% decline in its third-quarter 
profit (Grynbaum, 2007), which was then followed by a downgrade of the Standard & 
Poor’s credit rating of the company from AA down to A later that year and by a loss in the 
fourth quarter of 2007. Bear Stearns was then sold to JP Morgan Chase which was granted 
a $30 billion loan by Fed for this purpose.104 The failure of Bear Stearns hedge funds hurt 
also the already heavily troubled Lehman Brothers, another major U.S. investment bank 
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and the 2007 biggest mortgage-backed security underwriter, whose stock fell sharply on 
the event, and so contributed to its eventual fall-down a year later.105 
But the origin of the crisis was by no means a fault of the hedge fund industry. On 
the contrary, hedge funds were victims, too, since they were hit by the downfall on the 
capital markets. Their contribution to the turmoil was limited to increasing volatility in the 
markets due to their need to deleverage in order to meet investors’ demands, as we will see 
in the next paragraph. 
So, let us return to the general level. Looking back at the list of hedge fund 
characteristics mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, we can pick some of them that 
are especially relevant with respect to the latest crisis. They are the infrequent redemptions 
and the leverage. After the turmoil broke out in the investment banking sector, it affected 
financial markets and their participants globally. Since markets were sinking, investors 
preferred holding cash to investing in securities or other instruments. Hedge fund investors 
were of no exception. Hence, as the redemption periods were approaching, investors 
announced withdrawing their money from the funds, and they did it in their hundreds of 
thousands. Resemblance with the conventional bank run is no coincidence, since they 
actually were bank runs with the only exception that the “banks” in troubles were 
institutions coming from the shadow banking system. Problem with the funds was that they 
were heavily leveraged. In order to obtain cash necessary to satisfy investors’ withdrawal 
demands, they were forced to sell virtually everything that was in their portfolio. Since 
asset prices had already gone down, the funds were selling in large quantities at lower than 
reasonable price, pushing prices further down, decreasing values of their portfolios more 
and more. Hence, this “self-reinforcing cycle of forced liquidation of assets”106 aggravated 
volatility and decreased prices across the financial system. Geithner (2008) points out that 
“the scale of long-term risky and relatively illiquid assets financed by very short-term 
liabilities made many of the vehicles and institutions in this parallel financial system 
vulnerable to a classic type of run, but without the protections such as deposit insurance 
that the banking system has in place to reduce such risks”.107 There is a very close relation 
to the Krugman’s concern of malign neglect (Krugman, 2008) that has already been 
mentioned. In short, Krugman considers the rapid growth of the shadow banking sector 
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which remained ignored by the regulators to be a situation very similar to the one that 
preceded the Great Depression at the end of 1920’s. 
However, as far as hedge funds are concerned, this comparison is obviously 
exaggerated. Many hedge funds suspended redemptions in their expectations of worsening 
of overall economic situation, since selling of illiquid assets that they would have 
otherwise had to undergo would have caused even bigger losses to the investors that were 
about to stay in the funds. Hence the effect of runs of investors was reduced. The fact is 
that the boom of redemptions of 2008/09 and the associated pressure to deleverage 
endangered a lot of hedge funds, forcing many of them to close or go bankrupt and exit the 
market as a consequence of the crisis. This is illustrated by the 3-6% attrition rates usual in 
previous years suddenly accelerating to 13% in 2008 (Figure 14). However, within only a 
year, redemptions slowed down fairly and, as a consequence, attrition rates decreased 
sharply. Anyway, it is crucial to say that none of the fund closures imposed any substantial 
risk on the financial system, while incomparably higher losses and risks were created by 
failures of large banks. There were also cases of voluntary hedge fund closures decided 
upon by fund managers who found it more profitable in the altered economic conditions to 
terminate the operation of their fund (Król, 2010). 
Further, levels of funds’ leverage were significantly lower shortly before the crisis 
breakout than they had been in the late 1990’s. In Box 4 we have discussed the 1998 case 
of LTCM whose level of leverage shortly before the fall achieved approx. 3,000%. In 
Figure 15, we can see that although leverage of funds was continually rising over the 
recent decade, it was very far from the levels of LTCM even at its peak of 2007 when it 
amounted to 167% of assets under funds’ management. The deleveraging “race-to-the-
bottom” of the funds which had not suspended redemptions cut the leverage rates deeply 
down to 110% in 2008. Interestingly enough, in 2009 hedge funds achieved levels of 
leverage again similar to levels they had used prior to crisis. 
 Figure 14: Hedge fund attrition rates
Source: TheCityUK 
Figure 15: Hedge fund use of leverage
Source: TheCityUK 
In 2008, the average global hedge fund return declined sharply, from 12.4% in 2007 
to –13.9%, accounting for the worst annual loss in the history of the hedge fund industry.
Nevertheless, the industry survived rather well, since
in the very next year the average global hedge fund return achieved 19%, which was the 
best annual result of the decade.
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Figure 16: Average global hedge fund returns
Source: TheCityUK 
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 3.3.2. Private Equity Performance
Unlike hedge funds, private equity funds 
private equity investors are locked in the funds for long periods of time. The global 
economic crisis however showed its effect on privat
(1) The fundraising declined steeply. 
funds raised and in amount of investments. 
fell but still were very high, reaching $459
invested, the following year brought both values down to $150
respectively, the lowest values in a pretty long time.
Figure 17: Private equity development 
Source: TheCityUK 
Was the European private equity market affected, too? Yes,
the three EU countries with the largest private equity industry 
Germany – raised only $12
See Figure 18 for an illustration. Within the whole EU, t
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 Figure 18: Private equity – total funds raised and funds invested decline in the Top 3 EU private equity 
countries 
Source: TheCityUK 
(2) The investment activity of the funds in 2009 decreased, too, by 
$54 billion in 2008 to $20
comparison. 
Similarly, total divestment activity fell down significantly in 2009 due to global 
economic slowdown, to $81
equity exit transactions – all the IPOs, secondary sales to other private equity firm
sales to corporations – over recent decade is illustrated in 
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Figure 20: Private equity sector J-Curve – the W-Curve 
 
Source: Friedman (2010) 
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4. Regulatory Improvements 
4.1. Banks or non-banks? 
It is widely recognised that the financial system needs a regulatory reform after the 
outbreak of the crisis which it has been suffering from for the last couple of years. Legal 
initiatives to reform the regulatory framework, some of which have been outlined in the 
previous chapters, have earned support of banks and other financial institutions. Generally, 
they focus mostly on macro-prudential supervision, derivatives markets and prudential 
rules for banks. Importantly enough, they also widely include provisions on imposing 
regulation on alternative investment vehicles which are blamed by many to have 
contributed to the depth of the crisis. This is, however, a very questionable argument. 
Hence, is the extension of regulation over all non-bank financial institutions, i.e. including 
the alternative investment vehicles, really necessary? Is it not a useless burden imposed on 
the system? Are not the results going to be counterproductive? 
In the previous chapter, we have extensively discussed hedge funds and private 
equity funds, their performance of recent years and their regulation. It was a rather positive 
analysis. In this chapter, we would like to move on towards a more normative discussion 
on how we believe the regulatory framework for hedge funds and private equity funds 
should look like in order to be efficient but not excessively overregulated. 
As Petajisto (2010) states, the recent financial crisis has provided a real-life “stress-
testing” which has examined thoroughly all the fragilities of the system. But surprisingly, 
in this financial mess hedge funds performed relatively well. Although an average hedge 
fund fell by approx. 20%, there was no major hedge fund failure over the period, at least 
slightly similar to the case of LTCM of 1998. Also the levels of leverage were lower. In his 
article, Petajisto concludes that hedge funds took their lesson from the LTCM case and 
were prepared for times of turmoil. This is also confirmed by the fact that many of them 
suspended withdrawals which definitely contributed to the prevention of runs that would 
have brought significant failures. Obviously, there were runs on hedge funds anyway, since 
by far not all of them suspended redemptions. They resulted in an increased volatility on 
financial markets due to forced sales of illiquid hedge fund assets. However, this is a 
process the proposed regulation can do nothing about. 
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The European way of the regulatory response to the latest crisis follows conclusions 
of the De Larosière Report to a large extent (see Chapter 2.4.2.1). With respect to the 
parallel banking sector, the De Larosière Group recommends to: 
• extend appropriate regulation, in a proportionate manner, to all firms or 
entities conducting financial activities of a potentially systemic nature, even if 
they have no direct dealings with the public at large 
• improve transparency in all financial markets – and notably for systemically 
important hedge funds – by imposing, in all EU member states and 
internationally, registration and information requirements on hedge fund 
managers, concerning their strategies, methods and leverage, including their 
worldwide activities 
• introduce appropriate capital requirements on banks owning or operating a 
hedge fund or being otherwise engaged in significant proprietary trading and 
to closely monitor them111 
The Recommendation is understandable from a certain point of view. After the crisis 
hit the markets, efforts to prevent another crisis to happen in the future has focused on 
every market participant that could somehow be regarded to have contributed at least 
minimally to the origins of the crisis. Naturally, the alternative investment vehicles, and 
hedge funds especially, have not escaped the eyes of regulators. Before the crisis, they 
made huge amounts of money while virtually no-one really understood exactly how. They 
were hidden under the veil of secrecy, since they did not have to report any detailed 
information on their operations to the regulatory authorities. However, the basic principles 
were widely known to such an extent that was sufficient for blaming hedge funds 
responsible by many for the breakout of the crisis and for its depth. 
But the nature of the crisis has been more bank-like than anything else. It was the 
failure of banks that put the big things into motion, not of a hedge fund. As we know, 
banks were highly regulated also before the crisis, and still the crisis was allowed to 
happen. At the beginning of this thesis, in Figure 1, the amount of assets under 
management of world largest banks versus amount of assets under management of hedge 
funds and private equity funds was depicted. The difference in the amounts is huge. Hence, 
do we believe that extension of regulation over the additional tiny portion of the amount 
that we already regulate will be of much help? 
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It might be argued that the number of hedge fund failures increased rapidly after the 
crisis broke out. This is obviously true, as can be seen in Figure 14. However, instead of 
illustrating the systemic risk potential of the funds, this fact actually proves the opposite. 
Despite increasing of attrition rates far above usual levels, there has been no single major 
hedge fund failure endangering the system in recent years. Further, not all hedge fund 
closures refer to failures and losses for investors (Król, 2010). There have been many 
funds that terminated their activity upon their own decision. As an example, let us mention 
the quite recent case of the BlueCrest BlueTrend UCITS fund. Set up in 2009 by BlueCrest 
Capital, the fund operated under the UCITS structure which has been a trend recently, as 
was mentioned earlier in the thesis. However, the UCITS structure requires high levels of 
liquidity and transparency and it also imposes investment limits (Jones, 2010). Hence, 
operation of such a structure is very costly. High costs together with limits on what 
instruments it could invest in were the reasons why the BlueCrest Capital decided to 
terminate its BlueCrest BlueTrend UCITS fund. Nevertheless, over the life of the fund the 
investors had earned profits and were returned their investments after the fund closed 
down, thus the closure represented no major losses. 
The author of this thesis does not think excessive regulation to be imposed on hedge 
funds and private equity funds is necessary. And there are others who share this opinion. 
This view is supported for instance by CNB (2009): “The Czech National Bank is of the 
opinion that the range of regulated subjects should not be extended excessively. The 
current financial crisis has shown that there was rather a failure of judgement and 
regulation of exposition of banks as well as other already regulated financial institutions 
to the complex structured instruments (such as ABS). Sector fragmentation of the financial 
supervision and the related gaps in the oversight coverage of the markets with these 
instruments probably contributed significantly to this failure. Thus, attention should be 
devoted predominantly to closing of these gaps rather than to the additional enlargement 
of the range of regulated institutions”.112 Thus, according to the CNB, regulatory 
requirements imposed on hedge funds or private equity funds will be of little, if any, help. 
Instead, they will result in increases of costs of funds due to the costs of compliance which 
will inevitably be passed on to investors, or they will make funds leave the market. 
Further, regulatory authorities will end up with higher costs, too, since the extension of 
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regulation over wider range of institutions will necessarily result in significantly increased 
administrative costs. 
The good news is that major restructuring of financial regulatory framework has 
been pursued on both sides of the Atlantic which addresses the supervisory fragmentation 
and the related gaps in coverage that the CNB identifies. The U.S. approach recognises 
banking institutions as the fundamental issue to focus on, while admitting the alternative 
investment vehicles their minor systemic importance by not imposing heavy regulatory 
burden upon them. On the contrary, the EU approach of “regulating everything we can” is 
likely to be counterproductive. Restructuring of the financial oversight system within the 
EU is widely appreciated but the extension of regulation over AIFs via the AIFM Directive 
is debatable. 
Namely, instead of the effort to regulate hedge funds and private equity funds, an 
intensified regulatory focus placed on their major counterparties is a step in the right 
direction, since it is them who threatens the system the most if an investment fund turns 
out to be unlucky. By this, mostly imposing stricter rules on the funds’ major institutional 
investors and major lenders is understood, limiting the exposure of these counterparties to 
the risk of a fund failure. This represents a measure to treat the FSA’s credit channel of the 
alleged hedge fund systemic risk.113 While the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. incorporates 
such provisions on banks which prohibit or limit acquiring or retaining interests in hedge 
funds and private equity funds, the EU chose the way of imposing regulation directly on 
the alternative funds. 
Hence, as a suggestion to consider, the following subchapter outlines the main points 
of a hypothetical regulatory framework for AIFs and their managers that, as we believe, 
would be efficient and safe, while it would not impose excessive burden on the non-bank 
financial sector. 
4.2. Proposed Framework 
So far, we have mostly criticised the attempts at extending the regulatory framework 
over AIFs. However, not all regulatory requirements for AIFs that have arisen over recent 
years should be declined completely. Some of them actually do make sense and can be 
beneficial both for investors and funds themselves. In case of some others, it is not the 
question whether to apply them or not but rather in what way or to what extent to apply 
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them. This is confirmed also by AIMA (2009), as we mentioned in Chapter 2.4.2.2, and 
also by the operation of the UK framework of the hedge fund industry. In this light, we 
will outline a regulatory framework that we consider appropriate for the efficient 
functioning of both hedge funds and private equity funds within the EU and for their 
investors being protected adequately. Some of the proposed measures are also desirable for 
the U.S. AIF framework. 
Virtually all recent suggestions to regulate AIFs require them to be registered with 
and authorised by a supervisory authority. Registration and authorisation feature the UK 
hedge fund model which is widely acknowledged to be more efficient than the U.S. (pre-
Dodd-Frank) one. We share the opinion that registration and authorisation of AIFMs is a 
good thing, since this measure makes the non-bank sector more transparent. Hence 
registration and authorization of fund managers create the first point of our theoretical AIF 
regulatory framework. However, we adhere to the opinion of AIMA (2009) that all AIFMs 
should be registered and authorised, not only those managing assets over certain arbitrarily 
given threshold. There is no reason to regulate some funds while not to regulate others. 
Further, a threshold for registration would create incentives for fund managers to stay out 
of sight of regulators by artificially diminishing the value of funds and thus increasing the 
possibility of misconduct. 
The requirement of disclosure of systemically relevant data by funds only makes 
sense when it is applied to funds with at least some systemic risk potential. There is no 
need to apply it to all AIFs, since the vast majority of them do not have any potential of 
systemic impact at all. This would only impose excessive burden to regulators and 
excessive costs to smaller funds with no value added from the systemic point of view. 
Hence, on the contrary to the first point, there should be a sufficiently high threshold over 
which funds would disclose systemically relevant information to the regulatory authorities 
which would decide on the appropriate type but also volume of data.114 The AIFM 
Directive sets this threshold to €100 million which we consider to be too low, since the 
majority of funds would go beyond this limit. Instead, the AIMA’s suggestion of €1 billion 
seems to be a reasonable estimate of the amount of assets in a fund with some systemic 
importance. 
Further, provision of extensive information by fund managers to investors and 
counterparties should not be obligatory, since AIFs target professional investors who are 
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 Again, we are indebted to AIMA (2009) for leading us to this point. 
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sophisticated enough to gather the information and assess all the associated risks on their 
own. Similarly, counterparties of these funds are mostly banks or traditional investment 
funds who usually run their own risk assessment departments. Hence, to impose a duty of 
extensive information provision would increase administrative costs of funds without 
bringing any real value added with respect to investor protection, hence it would be 
inefficient. Instead, we suggest leaving this measure voluntary for funds which would be 
interested in providing extensive information to counterparties and investors as a means of 
a competitive advantage. 
As far as the EU regulatory framework is concerned, we support the AIFM 
Directive’s concept of the “EU passport”, since it will contribute to the enhancement of the 
EU Single Market by reducing administrative costs and “equalising opportunities for 
investors in different member states”.115 The authorization necessary for granting the 
passport, however, should not be set in such a way that non-EU fund managers would find 
it very hard, or nearly impossible, to enter the EU market, as it is currently set by the new 
AIFM Directive. This would significantly decrease the competitiveness of the EU financial 
market as well as reduce investor choice, leaving the European investors worse off. 
Instead, ad hoc approach should be pursued when dealing with non-EU funds or fund 
managers, so that countries of domicile of the non-EU funds or their managers could be 
assessed with respect to their level of prudential regulation and tax issues for each 
individual non-EU fund (manager) applying for authorization.  
EU AIFMs should be allowed to freely employ the knowledge and expertise of other 
fund managers to which they delegate certain functions, disregarding whether these 
delegates are European or not, because it is mostly the European investors who would 
benefit on the enhanced performance of the particular fund due to knowledge of the 
delegate. This holds for the depositaries (custodians), too. We believe that there is no need 
for custodians and subcustodians to necessarily be EU institutions, since by insisting upon 
such a rule, the supply of custody services to managers would shrink and costs of 
managers would rise. Similarly, there should not be a strict liability to its own failures 
imposed upon a depositary, as is the current state of things under the AIFM Directive, 
since fewer depositaries will become available to the managers and, more importantly, 
their fees will rise, increasing managers’ costs which will be passed to the investors, 
decreasing their returns on investments. 
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Limits on leverage of AIFs, and particularly hedge funds, have been a widely 
discussed topic over recent years (remember the case of LTCM in 1998). However, the 
author believes that imposing limits on leverage of funds nowadays is not a good idea. 
Firstly, levels of leverage today as well as shortly before the latest crisis were much lower 
than they had been in the days of LTCM and there has been no major crash of a (hedge) 
fund due to the crisis. Funds seem to have taken a lesson out of the LTCM or Amaranth 
cases and reacted adequately after the turmoil materialized, e.g. by suspending 
redemptions. Secondly, leveraged strategies are the factor which makes the AIF industry 
interesting for investors, since it has the power to create fair returns out of potentially 
uninteresting strategies. With limits on leverage, the industry would lose a great deal of its 
attractiveness. Lastly, leverage caps might act pro-cyclically under certain circumstances, 
since they would push further down the asset prices by forcing funds to deleverage in order 
to meet these requirements in times of market turmoil eroding the funds’ capital base 
(AIMA, 2009). Instead of leverage caps, we would recommend adopting provisions 
limiting the level of engagement of big institutional investors (such as banks or pension 
funds) in AIFs. Such measures would ensure that these investors would not be harmed by 
failure of a fund to such an extent that would be likely to start a chain reaction endangering 
the whole financial system or either of its parts. After all, the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act already 
incorporates such provisions. 
Lastly, there have been concerns raised over recent years about continuing 
retailization of the hedge fund industry. This may represent a threat to the financial system, 
since retail, i.e. unsophisticated, investors obtain access to hedge fund investments, while 
all the functioning of the industry including its relationship to the regulatory authorities has 
been designated for professional, i.e. sophisticated investors, who are able, equipped and 
resourced to perform their own risk assessment of the investment. On the contrary, a retail 
investor is very vulnerable. Since one of the intentions behind the hedge fund regulatory 
proposals has been (and should be) the investor protection, we suggest establishing a rule 
on the minimum investment requirements for hedge funds. €5 million seems to be a 
reasonable amount for the exclusion of unsophisticated investors and preventing the 
industry from further retailization tendencies. Such a rule would be easier, more efficient 
and transparent than imposing prudential regulation on the funds. 
The above mentioned suggestions on improving the regulatory framework for the 
AIFs and their managers predominantly react on the recently adopted AIFM Directive and 
they are largely based on the position of AIMA. Nevertheless, points 1-3 and 6-8 in Table 
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16, which provides a recapitulation of all the aforementioned suggestions along with their 
short description, are also applicable for regulatory frameworks of other jurisdictions, such 
as the U.S. 
Table 16: Summary of the proposed regulatory framework for the (EU) alternative investment funds 
Measure Description 
1. Registration and authorization of all AIFMs For the sake of a better overview and transparency of 
the shadow banking system registration and 
authorization of AIFMs is a desirable thing. 
However, threshold should be set to zero, so that 
regulatory authorities know about all the funds and 
managers operating in the market. 
2. Disclosure of systemically relevant data Only funds with a systemic risk potential should be 
requested to disclose relevant information. 
Otherwise, regulatory authorities would become 
clogged with useless data of no prudential worth. 
Therefore, there should be sufficiently high threshold 
for big funds to disclose systemically relevant data, 
e.g. €1 billion. 
3. Voluntary disclosure of extensive 
information to investors and counterparties 
Obligatory extension of information sharing is likely 
to be inefficient due to sophisticated investors. 
Instead, voluntary provision of extensive information 
might serve as a competitive advantage. 
4. “EU passport” without protectionist 
requirements 
The concept of granting access to financial markets 
of all member states once a fund manager has been 
authorized in one of them is welcomed throughout 
the sector. However, the approach to third country 
managers should not be of a protectionist nature, 
since it would be the EU investors who would pay 
the price. 
5. Delegation and depositaries not limited to 
being EU institutions 
Fund managers that have been authorized for the 
“EU passport” should still be allowed to access 
services of non-EU managers to delegate some of 
their functions to as well as non-EU depositaries, 
since access to global knowledge and experience 
would be a benefit for EU investors. 
6. No leverage limits Placing a cap on the amount of leverage an AIF can 
use is irrelevant, since levels of leverage used today 
are not likely to account for a systemic failure. 
Further, it would decrease the attractiveness of the 
industry. What is worse, it is likely to act pro-
cyclically. 
7. Tighter regulation of big institutional 
investors in AIFs, such as banks or pension 
funds 
Stronger regulatory requirements with respect to 
investing in AIFs or engaging in the business of 
AIFs placed on important institutional investors will 
mitigate the impact of losses due to a fund failure 
and will be more efficient than direct interventions in 
the AIF industry, such as placing a leverage cap. 
8. Obligatory minimum investment 
requirements 
Setting a sufficiently high minimum investment in a 
hedge fund would effectively exclude retail investors 
from engaging in the business, hence protect them 
from losses they would otherwise be likely to suffer 
from, since they are unable to assess all the 
associated risks thoroughly on their own. 
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Some of these suggestions have already been implemented in either of the two main 
regulatory acts that have been adopted recently – the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. and the 
AIFM Directive in the EU. However, the author believes that nothing but their joint 
adoption would create a safe, flexible and efficient regulatory framework that would be 
welcomed by all the AIFs, their managers, investors and regulators.  
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5. Conclusion 
Non-bank financial institutions, and especially the alternative investment sector, 
have come under intense scrutiny after the latest global financial crisis broke out. The AIFs 
have constantly been alleged by their opponents that they have a large systemic risk 
potential which is not subject to virtually any regulatory control. 
However, the crisis has been of a bank nature; the non-bank sector has been affected 
only after the crisis broke out. Obviously, AIFs have played certain role in the 
development of the turmoil but it has been limited to increasing price volatility in financial 
markets which is attributed to their acute need to deleverage. The size of the alternative 
investment sector based on the amount of assets under management is tiny in comparison 
to the banking sector or even to the conventional investment branch of the non-bank sector. 
Hence the risk inherent in the functioning of the sector is unlikely to have systemic 
consequences in case of a significant negative market development. 
This is not to say that there is no systemic risk incorporated in the AIFs at all. With 
respect to hedge funds, the risk of a potentially systemic nature lies in the fact that returns 
of hedge funds strategies are markedly correlated both mutually as well as with the 
development in the equity markets. Thus, Hypothesis 3 has not been rejected. As a result, 
rates of return of various hedge fund strategies tend to move in accordance with equity 
markets. Further, their mutual correlation means that when returns on one strategy decline, 
returns of other strategies are likely to decline, too. Therefore, a risk exists that with an 
adverse development in the markets the overall industry will get into serious trouble. This 
might result in significantly increased price volatility due to joint deleveraging. Moreover, 
if several important funds fail, a chain of failures of systemically important financial 
institutions – counterparties to failed hedge funds – might be triggered. 
In reality, however, we have not seen anything like that during the latest crisis; there 
has been no major hedge fund failure. Funds seem to have taken lessons from the past and 
are better prepared for periods of turmoil. The experience over recent decade, along with 
the small size of the alternative investment sector, thus supports the fact that systemic risk 
stemming from hedge funds is minor. Hypothesis 1 has therefore been rejected. 
Efforts to put the AIFMs subject to stricter regulation have intensified with the crisis 
especially in the EU. Certain reforms of the AIFM regulatory framework would be 
welcomed even by the industry itself; however, the resulting reform represented by the 
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AIFM Directive is likely to induce more costs than benefits. The reality is that banks as 
well as conventional investment vehicles, jointly managing amounts much bigger than 
those under management of AIFMs, are subject to strict regulatory requirements and still 
the latest crisis was not prevented from happening. Extension of strict regulatory measures 
over the tiny alternative investment sector will thus hardly be of any help in the struggle 
against systemic risk. On the contrary, provisions incorporated in the AIFM Directive are 
likely to reduce investor choice and decrease the overall competitiveness of the EU. These 
costs will more than offset benefits of higher transparency. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 has not 
been rejected. 
The pace and vehemence with which the AIFM Directive was prepared seem to have 
produced counterproductive results. In order to obtain an appropriate and efficient 
framework, as we believe, some measures of the Directive need to be rethought, some 
dismissed. A good example of an appropriate attitude is the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. 
The Act aims more at regulating counterparties to AIFMs rather than at regulating AIFMs 
themselves. For if major institutional investors are limited in their investments in AIFs, the 
already small systemic risk of the industry is further alleviated without excessive burden 
placed on the alternative investment sector. 
Besides tighter regulation of major counterparties of the AIFs, the thesis proposes 
other measures to be incorporated in the appropriate and transparent legal framework for 
the AIF operation. They are the registration and authorization of all AIFMs with threshold 
set to zero, obligatory disclosure of systemically relevant data to regulators with a 
threshold sufficiently high for the exclusion of systemically irrelevant funds, voluntary 
disclosure of extensive information to counterparties, a rethought concept of the “EU 
passport” without protectionist conditions, abolition of leverage caps and finally setting of 
minimum investment requirements in order to prevent retailization. We believe such a 
framework will provide for a higher investor protection and for a better overview and 
transparency of the alternative investment sector while it will not decrease its 
competitiveness nor increase overall social costs. 
The proposed framework is unlikely to prevent another crisis from happening but so 
is also the one set by the AIFM Directive, since the importance of AIFs for the outbreak of 
a similar crisis to the latest one would most probably be minor again. However, the latter 
one is likely to substantially increase costs for the industry, its investors and for regulators, 
without much value added in return. The proposed framework, on the contrary, reflects 
interests of all of them.  
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1. Introduction 
2. Theoretical background of (non-bank) financial market regulation and supervision 
3. Hedge funds and private equity during the global crisis 
4. Proposed improvements 
5. Conclusion 
The methodology chosen for the thesis corresponds to the institutional, theoretical nature of 
the thesis itself. Therefore, methods typical for institutional economics will be employed, i.e. 
broad survey, synthesis, comparison and critique of literature devoted to regulation and 
supervision of financial markets, with strong emphasis on the non-bank sector. The regulatory 
framework will be examined thoroughly. American and European regulatory measures will be 
discussed separately and they will be compared. Afterwards, the regulatory framework will be 
put into context with today’s world. By doing so, conclusions on the suitability of the (pre-
crisis) existing framework will be derived and possible improvements will be discussed. 
Further, the suggested framework will be set in the pre-crisis environment and the 
hypothetical development of the events in financial markets will be compared to the actual 
one; hence the efficiency of the framework improvements for potential future crises of a 
similar nature will be tested. 
